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YOU ONLY GET WHAT YOU CAN PAY FOR: DZIUBAK v.
MOTT AND ITS WARNING TO THE INDIGENT
DEFENDANT
INTRODUCTION
When an innocent person is convicted of a crime because the at-
torney he hired was negligent, that person has a legal action against
the attorney for malpractice.' Logically, it would not make a differ-
ence whether the attorney was hired by the person himself or
whether the attorney was appointed by the state as a public de-
fender. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with this logic
when it decided Dziubak v. Mott.2 Richard Dziubak should have
been able to sue his attorneys for their alleged negligence and be
compensated for the sixteen months he spent in prison and the
$32,000 in legal fees he incurred to obtain his freedom.' However,
when Mr. Dziubak attempted to sue his attorneys, the Minnesota
Supreme Court granted them absolute immunity from any liability.4
The court justified this decision by stating that indigent defendants
with allegedly negligent court-appointed attorneys have remedies
through the appeal process, motions for post-conviction review, and
habeas corpus relief.5 The court further reasoned that holding the
attorneys liable might inhibit their independence and deter others
from joining their profession.6 With this sweeping decision, Richard
Dziubak was deprived of his cause of action against his attorneys
because they had been his public defenders.7 In Dziubak v. Mott,8
1. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing malpractice and the elements of a
negligence claim against attorneys).
2. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
3. See infra notes 259-89 and accompanying text (discussing the factual background giving rise
to Mr. Dziubak's negligence action against his attorneys).
4. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 773.
5. Id. at 774-77.
6. Id.
7. Throughout this Note, the term "public defender" will refer to state public defenders, unless
otherwise indicated in the text. The term will also be used to include attorneys working for a
Public Defender Office and court-appointed counsel. For an overview of the different types of
public defense systems, see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. Where the distinction be-
tween the types of systems is important, it will be indicated in the text.
8. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
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the Minnesota Supreme Court became the latest to join an unwel-
come trend in holding public defenders immune from malpractice
liabilityY
In exploring this issue, the first section of this Note provides a
brief overview of the public defense system in this country, explain-
ing how and why public defenders are an essential element of the
criminal justice system. 10 The problems of underfunding and
overburdened caseloads of public defense are also discussed to illus-
trate why many malpractice claims arise."1
The next section presents the basic elements a former defendant
must prove in his malpractice claim,12 and also discusses the civil
rights claim a client may bring against his public defender. 3 The
following section details the different theories of immunity granted
to certain government bodies. 4
Next, this Note presents the federal courts' opinions discussing
immunity, including typical state malpractice actions and civil
rights claims.1 5 While federal courts once appeared to be moving
away from granting immunity to federal public defenders, they may
now be moving toward it in light of recent federal legislation. 6 Sim-
ilarly, while the state courts have historically refused to grant im-
munity, they too are increasingly extending it to their public
defenders.17
This Note then presents the state courts' treatment of public de-
fender immunity, including state court decisions which hold public
defenders liable for their malpractice,'8 and state court decisions
9. See infra notes 234-57 and accompanying text (discussing recent state court decisions in
which immunity from state malpractice claims was extended to public defenders).
10. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text (discussing the right to counsel and defense
systems which provide counsel for indigent defendants).
11. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of the public de-
fender and their effect on the indigent defendant).
12. See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing how an indigent defendant may
bring a malpractice claim against a public defender and discussing the elements for such a cause
of action).
13. See infra notes 111-46 and accompanying text (discussing section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act).
14. See infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text (discussing different categories of
immunity).
15. See infra notes 111-95 and accompanying text (discussing section 1983 cases and malprac-
tice immunity cases).
16. See infra notes 111-46 and accompanying text (discussing section 1983 civil rights cases).
17. See infra notes 196-257 and accompanying text (discussing state court cases both refusing
and granting malpractice immunity to public defenders).
18. See infra notes 196-233 and accompanying text (discussing states' bases for refusing to
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which hold public defenders immune from such liability.19 While
most states addressing the issue have declined to grant immunity,
the trend in some states is to extend such immunity.20
Section III provides a detailed summary of Dziubak2" and the
Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion,2 2 and is followed by the Analy-
sis section which examines the public policy concerns cited in the
case decision in light of the substantial body of precedent.23 The
Analysis section also challenges each of the arguments the court ad-
vanced to support its ruling, ultimately concluding that the court
wrongly decided the issue. The Analysis next presents alternatives to
immunity that are far more fair and less harmful to the indigent
client. 24 Finally, the Impact section illustrates the ramifications of
Dziubak, and other cases like it, with the most notable result being
the court's failure to address the real problems facing public de-
fense.25 This Note endeavors to illustrate that the concerns of the
court, while valid, should not serve to denigrate the right of an indi-
gent to sue for malpractice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Right to Counsel
It has only been in the last half of this century that criminal de-
fendants have truly gained one of the most crucial protections af-
forded them: the right to counsel. 26 Although the Constitution
grant malpractice immunity to public defenders).
19. See infra notes 234-57 and accompanying text (reviewing state court decisions granting
malpractice immunity to public defenders).
20. See infra note 234-57 and accompanying text (citing several state court decisions granting
immunity, signalling a move in the direction of extending immunity to public defenders from state
malpractice claims).
21. See infra notes 259-310 and accompanying text (discussing Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d
771 (Minn. 1993)).
22. See infra notes 320-76 (discussing the policy basis for the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision in Dziubak).
23. See infra notes 303-10 and accompanying text (addressing the arguments the Minnesota
Supreme Court relied on in deciding Dziubak).
24. See infra notes 346-53 and accompanying text (discussing indemnity and state-covered in-
surance as alternatives to immunity that still address deterrence concerns).
25. See infra notes 320-76 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of extending
immunity to public defenders for their malpractice).
26. As Justice Sutherland stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
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grants all criminal defendants the right to counsel,27 the Supreme
Court did not require the appointment of counsel for indigent de-
fendants until 1932.28 Today, all indigent defendants, whether in
federal29 or state3 0 prosecutions, and whether charged with a fel-
ony"t or a misdemeanor,32 have the right to appointed counsel.
Following these decisions, states who had not already done so im-
plemented systems to provide counsel for indigent defendants. 3 The
state systems typically fall into one of three defense systems - the
assigned counsel system, the public defender system, and the con-
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put
on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evi-
dence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
27. "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Co NsT. amend. VI.
28. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to uphold the right of counsel to defendants charged with capital crimes, and if a
defendant was indigent, the state, in certain situations, had to appoint counsel for him).
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that under the Sixth Amendment, all
defendants charged with a federal crime have the right to retain counsel, and if they are indigent,
to have counsel appointed for them).
30. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (holding that all defendants in state fel-
ony prosecutions have the right to counsel, and if indigent, to have counsel appointed for them);
see also infra note 32 (noting other proceedings in which courts have found the right to counsel to
attach).
31. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 341 (state felonies); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
459-60 (1938) (federal crimes).
32. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1972) (holding that all criminal defend-
ants have the right to counsel where imprisonment is a potential penalty). The Court has also
extended the right to juvenile delinquency proceedings where confinement might result, In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967), and to first appeals of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
(1963); cf. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that the right to counsel does
not extend to defendants in misdemeanor prosecutions where only a fine might be given). The
right to counsel may be waived by the defendant. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724
(1948).
33. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611.14-.21, .23-.27 (West Supp. 1995) (providing for the
establishment and funding of the Minnesota public defender's office). Actually, at the time of
Gideon, 37 states already provided counsel as a matter of right in felony prosecutions. ANTHONY
LEWIS. GIDEON's TRUMPET 132 (1964). Still, prior to the Supreme Court's decisions mandating
the provision of counsel, there was a low demand for defense services and therefore the need was
met mostly through local court-appointed counsel. Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Pro-
grams, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIs. L. REv. 473, 478.
Thus, in 1961, only three percent of the country's counties had formal public defender offices,
servicing approximately 25% of the population. Id. at 481 n.40.
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tract counsel system. a4 Under the assigned counsel system, the court
appoints private lawyers to represent indigent defendants.35 Under
the public defender system, the jurisdiction establishes a public de-
fender's office to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants. s6
In order to meet Gideon's mandate,37 many jurisdictions established
these public defender offices believing they were more economical
than appointed counsel systems. 38 Under the contract counsel sys-
tem, a court "contracts" with a private lawyer or law firm to re-
present poor defendants.39
B. The Problems of the Public Defender
Along with the Supreme Court's unequivocal pronouncement of
the right to counsel" came many problems for public defender of-
fices: most notably, under-funding and over-burdened case loads. 1
34. See Jill Smolowe, The Trials of the Public Defender, TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 48, 49-50
(explaining the three systems and noting the problems with each).
35. NORMAN LEFSTEIN. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS.
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR, METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 8 (1982). About 30% of the U.S.
population live in counties using the assigned counsel system. Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson,
Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense
Counsel Matter? 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 364 (1991). There may also be "mixed systems" where
both public defenders and assigned counsel represent many indigent defendants. LEFSTEIN, supra,
at 8.
Prior to the Supreme Court's explication of the right to counsel, the assigned counsel system
was most prevalent because there was no general requirement that states provide the indigent with
counsel, and therefore there was a limited need for public defense. Mounts, supra note 33, at 478
("[U]ntil fairly recently, attorneys were expected to provide these services out of a sense of profes-
sional and community responsibility.").
36. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 35, at 363 (stating, "when the state supplies counsel . . . it
may create a public defender's office to provide counsel for indigent defendants generally").
37. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (holding that the right of an indigent
defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
38. Mounts, supra note 33, at 480-81 (explaining that the Supreme Court's expansion of the
right to counsel warranted criminal defense services on a "totally unprecedented scale," creating a
"great incentive to local governments to minimize the expense of providing those attorneys").
Earlier proponents of the public defender system argued that this system would provide more
competent representation by allowing its lawyers to specialize in criminal law and receive regular,
reasonable salaries, unlike appointed counsel who usually were expected to donate their services.
Id. at 480.
39. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 35, at 363. About 5% of the U.S. population live in counties
served by contract counsel. Id. at 364.
40. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
41. For numerous accounts of lawyers lamenting the lack of resources and the number of cases,
see Smolowe, supra note 34, at 48-50. One Louisiana attorney became so frustrated he brought
suit against himself alleging incompetence. Id. at 48.
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The Bureau of Justice Statistics for fiscal year 1978 shows that state
and local governments allocated only 1.5 percent of their criminal
justice funds to public defense. 2 Today, that figure stands at only
2.3 percent, with the bulk of criminal justice funds going to law
enforcement, prosecutions, and prisons.43
The direct result of this underfunding is an inability to hire
enough attorneys," resulting in overburdened case loads.' 5 Many
studies have found that excessive caseloads is the most significant
problem facing public defenders.' 6 In 1970, one commentator found
that public defenders in New York City had an average caseload of
922 cases a year; public defenders in Philadelphia carried 600 to
800 cases annually; and public defenders in Oakland carried 300 a
year. 4'7 In severe contrast to these numbers, one research group con-
cluded, after studying public defender offices in Chicago, Detroit,
St. Louis, Oakland, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Washington
D.C., that a workable caseload would be 35 cases annually per at-
torney.' 8 Unfortunately, the problems are getting worse because as
state and local governments reduce the funding available for public
defense,' 9 the crime rate and number of arrests keep escalating, thus
increasing the need for public defenders.5 °
42. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTICS-1980 I1 (1981).
43. Smolowe, supra note 34, at 48. Prosecutors receive approximately four times the amount of
money that state and local public defenders receive. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1992 2-3 (1993).
44. Mounts, supra note 33, at 483.
45. For example, in 1985, there were six public defenders in Albuquerque's Metro Court as-
signed to handle 13,000 misdemeanor cases annually. Smolowe, supra note 34, at 49. The Chief
Public Defender succeeded in getting funds to hire three more lawyers, but even then, public
defenders did not meet with clients until half an hour before they appeared in court. Id.
46. The National Institute of Justice reported that public defenders identified their most press-
ing problems as excessive caseloads, funding shortages, information management, and staff
shortages. Assessing Criminal Justice Needs, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Dep't of Justice/ Nat'l Inst. of
Justice), Aug. 1992, at 2, 6. National Institute of Justice Director Charles B. DeWitt posits that
the most prevalent problem faced by criminal justice agencies across the nation is increased work-
loads as a result of illegal drugs and violent crime. Id. at 1.
47. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE UJ. 1179,
1248 (1975).
48. Paul B. Wice & Peter Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs: A National
Survey and Analysis, 10 CRIM. L BULL. 161, 182 (1974).
49. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L. J. 363, 363 (1993) [hereinafter Klein, Eleventh
Commandment] ("[D]ue to widespread financial difficulties impacting local and state govern-
ments, the money available for court-appointed counsel and public defenders has actually declined
in many localities.").
50. Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Coin-
1004 [Vol. 44:999
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Obviously, the number of cases an attorney has at one time seri-
ously impacts an attorney's time to prepare for a case.5" A lack of
time that is spent on a case can result in inadequate preparation and
analysis.52 The American Bar Foundation reported that most judges
identified an attorney's preparation of a case to be the most impor-
tant indicator of his competence.53 Overburdened caseloads decrease
an attorney's preparation time and therefore, his competence at
trial. As the former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated, "[j]udges have been exceedingly
troubled by the increasing number of instances of poor legal repre-
sentation that come to our attention. . . .I shall not hazard a guess
as to the exact percentage of cases that have suffered from inade-
quate advocacy, but I can say that in my view it is not
insubstantial."54
petent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 533 (1988) [hereinafter
Klein, Relationship] (explaining that "[tihe problem of ineffective assistance is becoming more
severe as state and local governments reduce the funding available for representing the indigent at
the same time that the number of arrests and, therefore, the need for public defenders increases").
The 1970's war on crime and the 1980's war on drugs led to an increase in law enforcement, and
as a result, an increase in arrests, prosecutions, and trials. Smolowe, supra note 34, at 49. Natu-
rally, this created a heightened demand for public defense services. Id. However, funding for
public defense did not proportionately increase and has led to exacerbate the problem of
overburdened caseloads. Klein, Eleventh Commandment, supra note 49, at 363.
51. Some lawyers describe the process as "plead-'em-and-speed-'em-through." Smolowe, supra
note 34, at 48. A public defender may often meet his clients for the first time in court. Id; see also
supra note 45 (describing Albuquerque's situation where public defenders often first meet clients
half an hour before court appearances). The court in Dziubak also noted that the state's public
defenders were operating significantly beyond their capacity and had "insufficient time to devote
to their cases and their clients." Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993).
52. The majority in Dziubak noted that malpractice can result from "acts or omissions due to
impossible caseloads and an under-funded office." Dziubak, 503 N.W. 2d at 776; see also Smo-
lowe, supra note 34, at 48 (discussing one public defender's suit against himself, alleging incompe-
tence due to his overburdened caseload).
53. Dorothy L. Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 105, 144. For a more optimistic, though unconvincing perspective, see Matthews v.
United States, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating "we take judicial notice of the fact
that those who are the busiest and under the greatest pressure often perform with the greatest
skill, diligence and effectiveness").
54. Klein, Relationship, supra note 50, at 569 (citing Irving R. Kaufman, The Court Needs a
Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A. J. 175, 176 (1974)). Klein also cites to an excerpt from the Final
Report of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice, which stated:
[Tihe most startling testimony came from a former U.S. Attorney for Connecticut
who stated that of the last twelve cases he tried as U.S. Attorney he was of the
opinion that one-half of the defendants were convicted because of incompetency of
their counsel. This so shocked him that he resigned his office to become the first head
of the Connecticut Criminal Defense Committee.
Id. (quoting the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Admission to
Practice, 67 F.R.D. 159, 166 (1975)) (emphasis added).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
Underfunding not only causes an insufficient number of attorneys
in the public defenders' office, but results in inadequate training of
the lawyers that are hired. This also increases the likelihood of inad-
equate representation. The Final Report of the National Study
Commission on Defense Services found that underfunding for
"training of lawyers who perform services for the poor has been a
major cause of the totally inadequate services being delivered today
in many, if not most U.S. jurisdictions." 55
Because the problems facing public defender offices directly effect
the indigent defendant,56 these problems must be addressed. As the
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants stated, "if providing an attorney to the poor is
to be meaningful, it is essential that the lawyer render effective legal
assistance. '57  The Committee stated that public defender offices
must have enough lawyers to avoid overburdened case loads and
their salaries have to be comparable to private attorneys. 58 The
same holds true for assigned counsel, in order to ensure they "do
everything required to defend their clients."59
Problems of inadequate legal defense services will remain and
most likely increase until the defender systems are cured of un-
derfunding and overburdened case loads. 60 The escalating problems
may explain the increasing amount of malpractice claims being
brought against public defenders. 61 The seemingly insurmountable
55. NAT'L STUDY COMM'N ON DEFENSE SERVICES, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS
IN THE UNITED STATES. FINAL REPORT 242 (1976). Lack of training and experience is most prev-
alent in court-appointed defense systems. See Smolowe, supra note 34, at 50 (explaining that
assigned attorneys are often "young and inexperienced or old and tired"). One example occurred
in a capital case where a court appointed lawyer, realizing he could not handle the case alone,
requested co-counsel and received a 75-year old lawyer with almost no criminal experience. Id.
The lawyers conducted no investigation, interviewed no witnesses in person, never went to the
crime scene, and introduced no evidence for their client's defense. Id. Following a conviction and
death sentence, a federal judge ordered a new trial, finding the first to have been "fundamentally
unfair." Id. When the second trial finally begins, it will be ten years after the defendant's arrest.
Id.
56. See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text (discussing the results of underfunding and
overburdened case loads).
57. LEFSTEIN, supra note 35, at 5.
58. Id. at I1.
59. Id.
60. The court in Dziubak, citing a statewide study, stated that the problems of underfunding
and excessive caseloads were only getting worse. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W. 2d, 771, 775 (Minn.
1993).
61. Generally, claims against criminal attorneys are only a small fraction of all malpractice
claims; however, such claims are increasing in frequency. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: A STATISTICAL STUDY OF DETERMI-
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problems may also explain the trend in states' responses of ex-
tending immunity to public defenders against malpractice.62
C. Malpractice in Criminal Law
Before discussing public defender immunity, a brief overview of
legal malpractice in criminal law and basic theories of immunity is
provided below." If a client feels that he has not received competent
legal representation, he may sue his lawyer for malpractice, usually
alleging negligence." Negligence is "conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against un-
reasonable risk of harm."6 5 A cause of action against an attorney
for negligence is basically the same as any other negligence action. 66
The plaintiff must show that his lawyer owed him a duty,67 his law-
yer breached that duty, 8 the breach of that duty was a proximate
NATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST ATTORNEYS 8 (May 1986); RONALD E.
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH. LEGAL MALPRACTICE 284 (3d ed. 1988). Claims against public
defenders are similarly increasing. "Inadequate funding has created a situation wherein over-
burdened defense counsel cannot possibly provide competent representation to all of the clients
they are assigned to represent." Klein, Eleventh Commandment, supra note 49, at 363. For exam-
ples of cases in which a malpractice claim was brought against a public defender, see Ferri v.
Ackerman, 440 U.S. 907 (1979); Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. I11. 1985); Bledstein v.
Superior Court, 162 Cal.App.3d 152 (2d Dist. 1984); Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn.
1975); Vick v. Hailer, 512 A.2d 249 (Del. Super. Ct.), afid, 514 A.2d 782 (Del. 1986); Hogan v.
Peters, 353 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. App. 1987); Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. App. 1980);
Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979).
62. See infra notes 234-55 and accompanying text (discussing the extension of civil immunity
to public defenders in malpractice actions).
63. Criminal defendants may also appeal a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel:
the defendant must show that his attorney was negligent and that but for his attorney's ineffec-
tiveness, the trial result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984).
64. The most frequently alleged bases of malpractice are negligence and breach of a fiduciary
obligation, which involves the lawyer breaching his duty of "undivided loyalty and confidentiality"
to the client. ABA STANDING COMM, ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY. THE LAWYER'S
DESK GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE 4 (1992). The negligence theory, though, is the most com-
monly used, as well as the most successful. DAVID J. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 2:5 (1980). Other theories include breach of an implied promise, tort concepts,
contract principles, theories combining tort and contract ideas, or even no specific basis. Id. § 2:3.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
66. Laurence H. Schnabel et al., Some Aspects and Issues of Legal Malpractice, in DEFEND-
ING THE PROFESSIONAL at 313, 321 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
125, 1982) (discussing the essential elements for a claim of legal malpractice).
67. Id. There must be an actual attorney-client relationship for a duty of care to exist. MEISEL-
MAN. supra note 64, § 2:1. For a duty to exist, it does not matter whether the lawyer is paid for
his services or not. Id.
68. Whether or not a party breaches his duty depends on the standard of care that is imposed
on the defending party. In a typical negligence action, the law imposes a standard of care which
the reasonable person would have exercised. W. PAGE KEATON ET AL.. PROSSER AND KEATON ON
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cause of the resulting injury suffered,6 9 and his attorney's negligence
resulted in actual damage.70
Although these four elements apply in all negligence actions
brought against attorneys, the criminal defendant may find it more
difficult to successfully prove them. For example, the third element
of a negligence claim, causation, can be an especially onerous bur-
den on the criminal defendant. 71 In establishing causation in any
malpractice action against an attorney, the plaintiff must "prove
that but for the attorney's negligence he should have achieved a bet-
ter result.172 A client suing his criminal lawyer, however, carries a
heavier burden: although actual innocence is not typically a required
element in a negligence action, recently it has been held to be rele-
vant.7" Furthermore, some courts require the criminal defendant to
THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, the duty of care expected from a profes-
sional (such as a doctor or lawyer) "is to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members
of his profession commonly possess and exercise." Schnabel et al., supra note 66, at 322. A typical
manner in which judges present this standard to the jury is "that the [professional] must have and
use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession
in good standing; and a [professional] will be liable if harm results because he does not have
them." KEATON et al., supra, § 32, at 187.
Some jurisdictions recognize a higher standard of care for professionals specializing in a certain
field, including lawyers, so the criminal attorney may be required to "possess and exercise knowl-
edge and skills not usually expected of the ordinary civil practitioner." MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 61, § 21.1. Mallen & Smith highlight some of the differences between criminal and civil
proceedings, such as discovery rules, burdens of proof, and admissibility of evidence. The differ-
ences are based on the fact that the criminal attorney is not concerned so much with his client's
financial status, but rather with his client's liberty and/or life. Id.
69. For a former criminal defendant, currently suing in civil court, this means that even where
the attorney's negligence is provable, the client has to prove that this negligence proximately
caused his conviction. MEISELMAN, supra note 64, § 16.1; see infra notes 78-79 (discussing addi-
tional elements that some courts require for a successful malpractice claim).
70. Schnabel et al., supra note 66, at 321-22 (discussing the elements of a negligence action
against an attorney).
71. For a discussion of the higher burden faced by a criminal defendant in a legal malpractice
action, see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
72. Mallen & Smith, supra note 61, § 21.3.
73. Id. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has recently held that in proving causation, the
criminal defendant must prove legal innocence, i.e. that the jury would not have found him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993). The same court also
held that the attorney could raise actual guilt of his client as an affirmative defense. Id. at 571.
The dissenting opinion criticized the ruling because the defendant, in proving his legal innocence,
could only use the evidence and witnesses that were present at his trial. Id. at 574 (Comptom, J.,
dissenting). The attorney, though, in proving actual guilt of his former client, is not so limited and
could use confidential communications he had with his client and otherwise suppressible evidence.
Id. (Compton, J., dissenting). It should be noted that some courts do require the criminal defend-
ant to prove his actual innocence of the underlying offense before he can succeed against his
attorney. Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a criminal defendant
must prove by preponderance of the evidence that he is innocent of the crime charged); Morgano
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obtain a reversal of his conviction or other post-conviction relief
before he may successfully sue his attorney for malpractice.74
In addition to malpractice actions, former defendants have also
brought actions against their defense attorneys under the Civil
Rights Act ("section 1983"). 7" In fact, most of the actions that are
brought against appointed counsel are brought by former convicted
clients who appear pro se under section 1983.76 Section 1983 states
a cause of action for any person who has been deprived of a consti-
tutional right by another person acting under color of state law."
Many indigent clients have tried to sue their public defenders under
section 1983 because of a perceived denial of their Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective counsel.78 Section 1983 actions are discussed
in more detail below, following an overview of immunity.
D. Immunity
Immunity generally is a "freedom or exemption from penalty,
v. Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 738 (Nev. 1994) (citing several cases in support of its holding that
criminals must prove actual innocense in order to prevail).
74. See e.g., Shaw v. State Dept. of Admin., 816 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Alaska 1991) (holding that
a convicted criminal defendant has to obtain post-conviction relief prior to suing his attorney for
malpractice); Morgano v. Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 738 (Nev. 1994) (holding that the criminal de-
fendant must plead that he obtained appellate or post-conviction relief to survive a motion for
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss); Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 561, 566 (Or.
1993) (holding that a convicted criminal defendant must plead exoneration of the crime through a
reversal on appeal or other post-conviction relief to succeed in his claim against his attorney).
75. 42 U.S.C.A § 1983 (1994). This statute provides a civil action for deprivation of rights and
states that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
76. MEISELMAN, supra note 64, § 16:2. These types of actions are usually brought by the for-
mer client because he has "nothing else to do," the fees for filing are typically waived, and the
pleadings are construed more favorably to the non-attorney drafter. Id.
77. For the text of § 1983, see supra note 75. "[A] person acts under color of state law only
when exercising power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' " Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317
(1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
78. See, e.g., Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir.) (holding public defender immune
from § 1983 claims but noting that other remedies are available), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102
(1976); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding public defenders immune
from section 1983 claims but acknowledging that the Sixth Amendment may be used to vindicate
criminal defendants' rights).
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burden, or duty."79 If someone enjoys immunity for his actions, he is
not liable for them. 0 The rationale for immunity is derived from the
notion that although the person has committed a wrong, important
social values require that the person not be liable. 1 As Judge
Learned Hand expressed, "it has been thought in the end better to
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to sub-
ject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retalia-
tion."8 The following sections address the different categories of
immunity, including sovereign, or governmental immunity, official
immunity, and judicial immunity.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign, or governmental immunity is the common law doctrine
which serves to protect all levels of government from legal actions.8
Unless the government has otherwise waived its immunity, this doc-
trine protects all of its acts or omissions. 4 In 1946, the United
States federal government waived its tort immunity, subject to im-
portant exceptions, 5 when Congress enacted The Federal Tort
Claims Act.86 Under one of these exceptions, the federal govern-
ment retains its sovereign immunity for "discretionary functions."8
Generally, this provision encompasses conduct that involves any sort
of policy judgment. 88
79. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1990).
80. KEATON et al., supra note 68, § 131, at 1032.
81. Id. For example, immunity is granted not so much for the individual's personal benefit, but
more for the "protection of government, which could not function if its officials ... had to bear
the vexation, time-consuming hardship, and risk of monetary loss inherent in responding to civil
suit." Comment, Liability of Court-Appointed Defense Counsel for Malpractice in Federal Crim-
inal Prosecutions, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1420, 1423 (1972).
82. Georgorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
83. KEATON et al., supra note 68, § 131, at 1033.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895 B (1979).
85. These exceptions include, among others, claims of negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter, claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel or slander, and claims arising in a
foreign country. 28 U.S.CA. § 2680 (West 1994).
86. Id. §§ 1346(b), 2671-680. The act states that "[tihe United States shall be liable, respect-
ing the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances." Id. § 2674; see also The Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1994) (waiving government's non-tort liability; this act was passed
in 1887).
87. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (West 1994). The relevant part of this exception applies to "the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion be
abused." Id.
88. KEATON et al., supra note 68, at 1039. Discretionary acts and functions have been defined
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The states similarly have limited their tort immunity. 9 Most
states abrogated their absolute immunity either by statute or judi-
cial decision.90 States usually replace their complete sovereign im-
munity with a statutory form of immunity, through the states' tort
claims act.9 1 Even where states have waived part of their immunity,
though, all have preserved the immunity with respect to basic policy
or discretionary judgments."
2. Official Immunity
Closely tied to the government's sovereign immunity is the doc-
trine of official immunity. Generally, this doctrine blankets govern-
ment officials personally with immunity for their actions, as long as
their conduct "fall[s] within the scope of their authority" and the
conduct "requires the exercise of discretion." 93 Early common law
did not widely recognize this type of immunity for government offi-
cials. 4 However, by 1959, the Supreme Court, building on an ear-
lier decision, 95 approved the extension of official immunity to even
lower level federal government officials in Barr v. Matteo. 6 Further-
more, in 1988, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act 97 by
making it the exclusive remedy for claimants alleging common law
as "[tihose acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or
must not take and, if there is clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990).
89. However, Maryland and Mississippi have essentially retained their complete sovereign im-
munity. KEATON ET AL.. supra note 68, at 1044 n.25.
90. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4.92.090 & 4.96.010 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (waiving government's absolute immunity);
Mayle v. Pa. Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 709-10 (Pa. 1978) (abolishing doctrine of sover-
eign immunity and noting its unfairness).
91. See KEATON et al., supra note 68, at 1045 (discussing statutory forms of immunity); see,
e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032(2) (1987) (dealing with government immunity provisions); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-8564 (1982) (providing Pennsylvania's statutory government immu-
nity provisions).
92. KEATON et al., supra note 68, at 1044; see infra note 93 and accompanying text (defining
discretionary functions).
93. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (6th ed. 1990).
94. Comment, supra note 81, at 1422-23 (discussing the development of official immunity).
95. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896) (granting the same type of immunity judges
enjoyed to the Postmaster General).
96. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Concerned with the unfortunate impact that immunity has on individ-
uals harmed by federal officials, the Supreme Court has strived to extend immunity only when
necessary to promote effective government. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 299 (1988). This
balancing test evolved into the "functional" approach to extending immunity, i.e. immunity at-
tached only to particular official functions, not to particular offices. Id. at 296 n.3.
97. 28 US.C.A. §§ 1346(b), (West 1993).
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wrongs committed by federal employees acting within the scope of
their employment.9 The amendments also explicitly extend this pro-
vision to officials and employees in all three branches of
government .99
On the state level, however, official immunity is not quite as ex-
pansive as that on the federal level. In most states, public officials
enjoy only a qualified immunity for "discretionary" acts and no im-
munity for "ministerial" acts. 100 Also, the qualified immunity usu-
ally will not cover acts done with malice or bad faith, or objectively
unreasonable conduct.' 0'
98. Id. § 2679(b). The amendments, popularly known as the "Westfall Act," were Congress'
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988). There, the
Supreme Court held that absolute immunity from state-law tort liability does not attach to federal
officials' conduct unless their conduct is "within the outer perimeter" of their duties and is "dis-
cretionary in nature." Id. at 300. The Westfall Act now provides absolute immunity to federal
government officials for conduct within the scope of their employment, whether or not discretion-
ary, by making the Federal Tort Claims Act the claimant's exclusive remedy. 28 US.CA.
§ 2679(b) (West 1994). The full provision reads as follows:
(b)(1) The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672
of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or result-
ing from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any
other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject
matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against
the estate of such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages
arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the
employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of
the Government -
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which
such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
id.
99. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (West 1994). The Westfall Act's exclusive remedy provision applies
only to employees of the government "acting within the scope of [their] office or employment." Id.
§ 2679(b)(1). Section 2671 in turn defines "employee of the government" as including "officers or
employees of any federal agency . . . and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or
without compensation." Id. Prior to the Westfall Act, "federal agency" was defined to include the
executive branch of government only. See Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 201 n.5 (7th
Cir.) (discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act as originally enacted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670
(1994). The 1988 amendments, though, expanded the definition of "federal agency" to include
both the judicial and legislative branches of governments as well. 28 USCA § 2671 (West 1994).
100. KEATON et al., supra note 68, § 132, at 1059. A "ministerial act" is defined as "[tihat
which involves obedience to instructions, but demands no special discretion, judgment, or skill."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 996 (6th ed. 1990).
101. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (6th ed. 1990).
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3. Judicial Immunity
The final type of immunity relevant to this Note is judicial immu-
nity.10 2 Judicial immunity confers "absolute protection from civil li-
ability arising out of the discharge of judicial functions" to every
judge.' Judicial immunity is absolute in that it also applies to judi-
cial actions0 4 done in bad faith. 0 5 In addition to judges, judicial
immunity has been extended to prosecuting attorneys, hearing of-
ficers, administrative law judges, and grand juries. 06 As one com-
mentator has pointed out, however, a "notable exception to this ex-
tension of the immunity is the public defender, who is seen as a
lawyer with a primary duty to a client rather than as a public offi-
cial." 107 The next two sections fully explain how the federal and
state courts have applied these doctrines of immunity to public
defenders.
E. Federal Decisions on Immunity for Public Defenders
At one time, there was substantial authority among the federal
courts holding public defenders immune from suits brought by for-
102. Another type of immunity which congressmen enjoy is legislative immunity. Article I of
the Constitution confers immunity "for any Speech or Debate in either House." US. CONST. Art.
1, § 6, cl. 1. This has been construed to include "whatever a congressman feels necessary to
transact the legislative functions and business," even if done with a bad motive. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 900 (6th ed. 1990). Immunity protects legislators as long as their acts are of a legis-
lative nature and are within the scope of their jurisdiction, even if done with malice or corrupt
motives. KEATON et al., supra note 68, § 132, at 1056-57. Even if a state's sovereign immunity
has been abrogated, a legislative and judicial immunity is preserved for legislation and judicial
judgments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B cmt. c (1979).
103. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990).
104. The immunity generally does not apply to non-judicial functions. See, e.g., Scott v. City of
Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106 (1978) (restating New York case law that the doctrine of
judicial immunity does not apply to purely ministerial acts); see supra note 105 (defining "minis-
terial" act).
105. BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990).
106. KEATON et al., supra note 68, § 132, at 1057-1058.
107. Id. at 1058. But see Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.w.2d 771, 773 (Minn. 1993) (granting
absolute judicial immunity to public defenders). For a discussion of Dziubak, see infra notes 264-
322 and accompanying text. Furthermore, federal public defenders may now be accorded official
immunity under the recently amended Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671-
2680 (1994). See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments which
make the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy in most claims against federal govern-
ment officials and employees); see also Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 200 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding federal public defenders to be "employee[s] of the government" for purposes of the
exclusive remedy provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act and thus not subject to suit person-
ally), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670 (1994).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:999
mer clients.'" 8 As noted earlier, most actions brought against court
appointed counsel were done so under section 1983, with indigent
clients alleging a denial of their Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel. 109 Although section 1983 claims and malpractice claims are
distinguishable on other matters, the policy considerations and argu-
ments regarding immunity apply equally to both." 0
1. Section 1983
Two issues are present in the section 1983 context, and the courts
have responded differently to each. The first issue is whether the
public defender acts "under color of state law,"' and the second is
whether the public defender is immune from section 1983 claims,
regardless of whether he acts under color of state law." 2 It should
be emphasized that these two issues are very distinct, even though
they may have the same practical effect. For example, if a court
rules that public defenders do not act under color of state law, it
effectively renders them immune from section 1983 claims."" Some
courts have held public defenders to be immune from section 1983
claims without addressing whether or not they even acted under
108. See, e.g., Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir.) (holding public defenders to have
absolute immunity from section 1983 claims), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1976); John v. Hurt,
489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (holding public defenders immune from section
1983 claims); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir.) (holding public defenders to be
immune under section 1983), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1972); Sullens v. Carroll, 446 F.2d
1392, 1393 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (granting immunity from malpractice to federal court
appointed counsel); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828, 828 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (extending
absolute immunity from civil suit to court appointed counsel).
109. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing how criminal plaintiffs use
§ 1983 as a means of suing their attorney for denial of their Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel).
110. See infra notes 125-95 and accompanying notes (discussing immunity from § 1983 claims
and immunity from malpractice claims, including a discussion of policy considerations).
I11. See Dodson v. Polk County, 628 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that public
defenders do act under color of state law), rev'd, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Robinson v. Bergstrom,
579 F.2d 401, 405-408 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (holding that public defenders do act under
color of state law). But see Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
public defenders do not act under color of state law), modified on other grounds, 583 F.2d 779
(5th Cir. 1978); Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (holding
that public defenders do not act under color of state law).
112. See infra notes 125-43 and accompanying text (discussing immunity under section 1983
claims).
113. This is because one of the elements of the claim is missing, thus jurisdiction does not
attach. See notes infra 115-26 and accompanying text (discussing section 1983 claims and the
required elements to sustain a cause of action).
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color of state law.114 The importance of each issue's resolution will
be discussed after they are explained in the following subsections.
a. Public Defenders Do Not Act Under Color of State Law
The question of whether a public defender acts under color of
state law is significant because section 1983 only provides a cause of
action to those who have been deprived of a constitutional right by a
person acting under color of state law. 115 The Supreme Court defini-
tively resolved this issue in Polk County v. Dodson,"" when it ruled
that public defenders do not act under color of state law. 17 The
Court stated that the public defender's "assignment entailed func-
tions and obligations in no way dependent on state authority."' 118
The Court reasoned that the attorney-client relationship of a public
defender was identical to that of a private attorney and client. 1 9
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the public de-
fender's employment relationship with the state provided the basis
of "acting under color of state law."'' 0 Instead, the Court noted that
public defenders are not subject to the same administrative controls
as other state employees.' 2' Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a
state is constitutionally required "to respect the professional inde-
pendence" of its public defenders,' 22 and this requires public defend-
ers to "be free of state control."' 2 3 Thus, the Court concluded that
public defenders "do not act under color of state law when perform-
ing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a
criminal proceeding. "124
114. See infra notes 125-43 and accompanying text (discussing immunity under section 1983
and relevant case law discussing the extent of such immunity for public defenders).
115. For the full statutory provision, see supra note 75.
116. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
117. Id. at 325.
118. Id. at 318.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 321.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 321-22.
123. Id. at 322; see also id. at 327 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing the idea that the
public defender acts completely independent of the state).
124. Id. at 325. The Supreme Court again reached the issue of whether a public defender acts
under color of state law in a case involving a charge of conspiracy against a public defender.
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984). The Court expounded on the earlier case of Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980), in which the Court had ruled that private persons do act under color
of state law when involved in a conspiracy with others who are state officials in order to deprive a
person of constitutional rights. Id. at 27-28. Based on Dennis, the Court ruled that public defend-
ers do act under color of state law if they engage in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive
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b. Immunity under Section 1983
As noted earlier, immunity under section 1983 is a distinct issue
from section 1983's requirement of acting under color of state
law.' 25 Although the difference is now only theoretical in the section
1983 context, 2 ' it remains important to discuss section 1983 immu-
nity because of its relevance to malpractice immunity.
In Brown v. Joseph,2 7 decided before Polk County v. Dodson,'28
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
county public defender is immune from section 1983 liability, even
if he was acting under color of state law. 129 The court correctly
noted that the same arguments offered to prove that public defend-
ers act under color of state law also justify granting immunity.' 30
These arguments include the claim that public defenders are very
similar to prosecutors, who already enjoy such immunity, because
defenders have similar duties in a criminal proceeding, the law man-
dates both positions, and both should exercise independence in their
duties.' 3' The court also believed there were policy considerations
which warranted a finding of immunity. 32 These concerns included
the fear that liability would hinder recruitment of capable lawyers
to the public defender office and that liability would have a "chilling
effect" on the attorney's choice of strategies.' 33
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, prior to Polk County v. Dodson,"" held that public defend-
ers enjoy immunity from section 1983 liability in John v. Hurt.'35
another of his constitutional rights. Tower, 467 U.S. at 916.
125. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of under color
of state law and discussing its distinction from immunity).
126. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining when a court finds that public
defenders do not act under color of state law, as the Supreme Court did in Polk County, it effec-
tively renders them immune from suit because a jurisdictional requirement is missing).
127. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1972).
128. 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law).
129. Brown, 463 F.2d at 1048. This opinion later was criticized for "its unsoundness as policy"
and because it ignored a lower court opinion of an opposite ruling. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d
735, 739 n.8 (Pa. 1979); see Ronald E.Mallen, The Court-Appointed Lawyer and Legal Malprac-
tice - Liability or Immunity, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 59, 64 n.48 (1976) (stating that the court
never discussed an unreversed lower court opinion that refused to grant immunity to public
defenders).
130. Brown, 463 F.2d at 1049.
131. Id. at 1047-48.
132. Id. at 1049.
133. Id.
134. 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law).
135. 489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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The Seventh Circuit noted that the same reasons advanced for the
claim that public defenders act under color of state law also support
a finding of immunity.136 The court listed arguments that public de-
fenders act under color of state law: the defender is employed by the
government, receives a salary and an office from the government,
and appears to other people to possess state authority. 13 7 The court
also based its decision on the same policies the Third Circuit'38
cited: to foster recruitment of lawyers and to encourage indepen-
dence in their duties.13 9
After these cases granting immunity under section 1983, the Su-
preme Court addressed this issue with respect to intentional miscon-
duct on the part of public defenders, and held that there was no
immunity. 4" The Court discussed arguments advanced in support of
immunity, namely that public defenders have duties similar to
judges and prosecutors, that the threat of liability for intentional
misconduct could have a "chilling effect" on defense tactics, and
that the ruling could lead to a floodgate of section 1983 claims.14 1
However, the Court explicitly found that the common law did not
support a finding of immunity for the public defenders' intentional
misconduct, like it would for prosecutors and judges.142 The Court
declined to grant immunity and instead held that it was up to Con-
gress to decide. 143
c. Section 1983 Cases & Malpractice.
As discussed above, both issues in the section 1983 context involve
the same policy considerations. More importantly, it should be noted
that the arguments the lower courts cited to support a finding of
immunity from section 1983 liability actually conflict with the argu-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 787.
138. Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1972); see
supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Brown opinion).
139. Brown, 463 F.2d at 1048. Other decisions that have extended immunity under section
1983 include Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Miller v. Barilla,
549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976). But see infra note
176 and accompanying text (explaining that the Seventh Circuit later held that Robinson was
most likely overruled).
140. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 916 (1984); see also supra note 124 (discussing the same
decision and its holding that public defenders do act under color of state law when involved with
other state officials in a conspiracy to deprive someone of his constitutional rights).
141. Tower, 467 U.S. at 922.
142. Id. at 921-22.
143. Id. at 923.
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ments the Supreme Court cited to find that public defenders do not
act under color of state law."' This conflict, though no longer of
practical significance in the section 1983 context, 45 is important
when addressing immunity in the malpractice context, on both the
federal and state levels. 46 The arguments advanced both in support
and in opposition of granting malpractice immunity to public de-
fenders are based heavily on the same public policy concerns, hence,
their adoption or rejection by other courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, in section 1983 cases becomes relevant. These arguments in
the malpractice context are explained more fully in the following
sections.
2. Malpractice
In addition to section 1983 immunity, federal courts have also ad-
dressed malpractice immunity for federal public defenders. a4 This
topic is somewhat more complex because within a relatively short
time period, the courts and Congress have espoused dramatically
different views on the subject. 48 This section discusses the different
trends in this area and emerges with what is the current, and likely
future, state of the law.
The earliest court decisions addressing the issue of malpractice
immunity for federal public defenders granted such immunity. One
of the first decisions was Sullens v. Carroll.4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on an earlier
Fourth Circuit decision, Jones v. Warlick,50 that extended absolute
immunity from civil suit to federal court-appointed counsel, just as
144. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text (discussing arguments relied upon by the
lower courts in support of granting section 1983 immunity to public defenders); see infra notes
116-24 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons for the Supreme Court's decision that pub-
lic defenders do not act under the color of state law).
145. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisdictional requirements
of a section 1983 claim).
146. See infra notes 147-258 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state courts' deci-
sions on public defender immunity).
147. See infra notes 147-95 and accompanying text (discussing several federal court decisions
addressing malpractice immunity for public defenders).
148. See infra notes 153-67, 177-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court
decision where immunity was not granted to appointed counsel under a section 1983 claim and
Congress' enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act that extended such immunity).
149. 446 F.2d 1392, 1393 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (granting malpractice immunity to
federal court appointed counsel).
150. 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
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immunity extended to any other federal public official. 15' Both deci-
sions were based on the lower court's unpublished opinion in Jones,
and therefore no substantial opinion from either court is available.
As noted earlier, most actions against public defenders in federal
courts are brought under section 1983, and therefore, federal courts
appear to rarely address the issue of common law malpractice. 52
However, the Supreme Court did have occasion to address malprac-
tice immunity for federal court-appointed counsel in Ferri v.
Ackerman.5 1
In Ferri, the Supreme Court held that under federal law, attor-
neys appointed by a federal court judge are not entitled to absolute
immunity in state malpractice suits.15 In deciding the issue, the Su-
preme Court stated that such immunity, if it existed at all, would
have to be supported by either the Criminal Justice Act of 1964155
or the Supreme Court's cases dealing with immunity of federal of-
ficers.' 56 The Court held that Congress had not intended to provide
for a defense of immunity under the Criminal Justice Act. 5 1
Rather, Congress had attempted "to minimize the differences be-
tween retained and appointed counsel" and that Congress appar-
ently "intended all defense counsel to satisfy the same standards of
professional responsibility and to be subject to the same controls. ' 158
The Court then recognized the arguments for immunity, such as the
fact that court appointed counsel are paid by federal funds, the risk
of deterring lawyers from representing criminal defendants, and the
prejudicial effect liability may in fact have on the indigent's case.' 59
The Court dismissed these propositions, though, as "speculative"
and lacking in empirical support.'60
151. Id. at 828.
152. See supra notes 75-78, 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing section 1983 claims in
federal court).
153. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
154. Id. at 205. The Court, however, did note that it was not deciding the question of whether
states could provide absolute immunity under their own laws. Id. at 198.
155. 18 U.SC. § 3006A (Supp. 1994). The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 was enacted to pro-
vide compensation for assigned counsel in federal criminal proceedings. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 199.
156. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 198.
157. Id. at 199.
158. Id. at 199-201.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 201. It should also be noted that Congress has enacted legislation designed to pro-
tect federal public defenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(3) (Supp. 1994) (authorizing the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to indemnify or purchase liability
insurance for federal public defenders).
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The Court next addressed the argument that immunity should ex-
tend to court-appointed counsel because they are public officers, per-
forming their official duties.16' The crux of this argument was that
the court-appointed lawyer is like a judge or prosecutor, who are
deemed federal officers in the judicial setting and thus enjoy immu-
nity.'62 However, the Court plainly responded that "[tihere is . . . a
marked difference between the nature of counsel's responsibilities
and those of other officers of the court."' 63 Namely, the difference is
that prosecutors and judges serve society's interest as a whole, while
the public defender's primary duty is to his client. 6 The Court re-
jected the fallacious logic in the arguments for immunity, noting
that "the fear that an unsuccessful defense of a criminal charge will
lead to a malpractice claim does not conflict with performance of
that function. If anything, it provides the same incentive for ap-
pointed and retained counsel to perform that function compe-
tently."' 65 In sum, the reasons for extending immunity to judges and
prosecutors, as well as other public officials, simply did not apply to
public defenders. 66 The Court concluded that this type of decision
was best left to Congress to decide on the basis of empirical data,
and left open the possibility that an increase in court-appointed
counsel's salaries might be the more prudent step to take. 67
Prior to the Ferri decision, several circuit courts held court-ap-
pointed counsel to be immune from liability as judges and prosecu-
tors are, usually in the section 1983 context. 6 8 However, those hold-
ings were weakened, if not overruled, by Ferri.'69 As one
commentator noted, even though the Supreme Court did not discuss
the circuit court opinions extending immunity-to public defenders, it
did recognize the same arguments courts typically had advanced in
161. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 202.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 203-04. In fact, "an indispensable element of the effective performance of [the pub-
lic defender's] responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the Government." Id. at 204.
165. Id.
166. Id. The primary reason for extending immunity to public officials "is to forestall an atmo-
sphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated functions
in a principled fashion." Id. at 203-04.
167. Id. at 204-05. The increase in salary would serve to mitigate the fear that liability would
prevent capable lawyers from representing indigent defendants. Id. at 205.
168. See supra notes 108, 127-39 and accompanying text (listing and briefly discussing some
cases that granted immunity).
169. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (discussing the court decisions that relied
on Ferri to reject granting immunity to federal public defenders).
1020 [Vol. 44:999
1995] DZIUBAK v. MOTT 1021
favor of immunity. 170 Therefore, "[s]ince the Supreme Court did set
forth and reject the arguments which were the bases of such deci-
sions ...their viability as controlling precedent is doubtful.''
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ex-
pressed this sentiment one year following the Ferri decision in White
v. Bloom.172 The Court of Appeals noted that at least four circuits
had extended the immunity judges and prosecutors enjoy to court-
appointed counsel.173 However, in light of the Ferri decision, the
court stated that the position adopted by the other circuits was "no
longer tenable.' 1 74 The Eighth Circuit- continued even further and
held that although Ferri involved only a state malpractice claim, the
Court's logic also applied to section 1983 claims. 75 Thus, the court
refused to grant the absolute immunity that judges and prosecutors
share to appointed counsel. 76
Hence, the Ferri decision, and the line of cases following it, led
some commentators to believe that the defense of immunity for pub-
lic defenders in federal courts was "primarily of historical inter-
170. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 61, § 17:7, at 22 (stating that the Supreme Court's identi-
fication and rejection of the arguments which were the bases of the circuit courts' rulings was
tantamount to minimizing those cases' precedential value).
171. Id.
172. 621 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 945 (1980).
173. Id. at 280. These circuits included the Seventh, the Ninth, the Fourth, and the Third. For
an example of these cases see, e.g., Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978); Miller
v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976); and Brown
v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). For a fuller listing of
cases granting immunity, see supra note 113.
174. White, 621 F.2d at 280.
175. Id. It should be noted that not all circuits had so interpreted Ferri. Rather, some of them
construed Ferri as applying only to malpractice actions, and that section 1983 immunity was still
valid. MALLEN & SMITH. supra note 61, § 17:7, at 22 (citations omitted). However, as discussed
earlier, in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984), decided after these other cases, the Supreme
Court found that absolute immunity for public defenders was not supported by the common law,
and they could be liable for conspiracy under section 1983. Id. at 922.
176. White, 621 F.2d at 280. Other circuits similarly held that Ferri militated against granting
immunity. See, e.g., Glover v. Tower, 700 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Ferri
precluded granting immunity to public defenders), affd & remanded, 467 U.S. 914 (1984); Hall
v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that in light of Ferri, a prior decision
granting immunity to public defenders may no longer be good law); see also Sullivan v. Freeman,
944 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Ferri most likely overruled an earlier decision
granting absolute immunity to federal public defenders under federal law and that federal public
defenders were not immune under Illinois law).
There was, however, one circuit court that ignored Ferri, and held public defenders to be im-
mune from all Civil Rights Act claims. Without citing to Ferri, the Third Circuit held that public
defenders, by virtue of acting within the judicial process, enjoy the same immunity as judges and
prosecutors. Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 648-49 (3d Cir. 1981).
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est.' 1 7 However, with respect to malpractice immunity, the issue
once again is receiving renewed scrutiny, this time in response to
Congressional action. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Ferri v. Ackerman17 8 was addressing immunity for federal
public defenders from state malpractice suits under federal law.17 9
The Court found that such immunity was not supported by existing
law, 80 and ruled instead that such a decision would have to be
made by Congress. 8' In 1988, Congress arguably did decide to ex-
tend such immunity.
In 1988, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act' 82 to
make it the exclusive remedy for claimants alleging torts committed
by federal officers and employees acting within the scope of their
employment.' 8 Congress further amended the Act by extending the
exclusive remedy provision to employees in the legislative and judici-
ary branches. 8 If the amendments apply, they require the claimant
to proceed against the United States only and not the covered em-
ployees individually, thus, effectively rendering the employees im-
mune from suit.' 85 It should also be noted that although these
amendments do not deprive a claimant of his cause of action, they
ultimately serve to limit substantially any chance of recovery as the
United States retains its immunity for "discretionary" functions and
duties.' 81
177. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 61, § 17.7, at 17.
178. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
179. Id. at 204.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 205.
182. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b) (West 1993).
183. Id. § 2679(b)(1) (1994).
184. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting that the amended definition of "govern-
ment employee" included employees in all three branches of government).
185. 28 U.SCA. § 2679(b)(1) (1994). For the full text of § 2679(b)(1), see supra note 98.
For the provision to apply, the defendant employee must notify the Attorney General of the pend-
ing suit and the Attorney General must then certify that the employee was acting within the scope
of his employment when the incident occurred. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2679(c)-(d) (1994). In the event
the Attorney General refuses to certify the defendant employee, the employee may petition for
court certification. Id. § 2679(d)(3). Once certification is made, the United States is substituted
as the party defendant. Id. § 2679(d).
186. 28 US.C.A. § 2680(a) (1994). For a full discussion of the provision as well as a brief
definition of "discretionary" acts, see supra notes 87-88. Relevant to this point is a study con-
ducted by the ABA that indicated that administrative or clinical errors were only a small percent-
age of the errors alleged in criminal malpractice cases. Feeney & Jackson, supra note 35, at 393
(citing ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE: A STATISTICAL STUDY OF DETERMINATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS ASSERTED
AGAINST ATTORNEYS (May 1986)). In contrast, substantive and client relations errors (arguably
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ap-
pears to be the only court to consider the applicability of the amend-
ments to federal public defenders. In Sullivan v. United States,18
7
the court ruled that the exclusive remedy provision of the amended
Federal Tort Claims Act did apply to federal court-appointed coun-
sel, thus barring suit against them personally.' The court noted the
Supreme Court's holding in Ferri v. Ackerman,'89 and the distinc-
tions it made between appointed counsel and other public officers
accorded immunity. 9 ° However, the Seventh Circuit also noted that
Ferri suggested the possibility of Congress creating such immunity
and found that it did so with the amendments to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.'91 The court thus affirmed the dismissal of the public
defenders from the suit and the substitution of the United States as
defendant." 2
Because this is apparently the first court to address this issue, it
remains to be seen how other circuits will interpret the amendments
and whether or not they will similarly rule federal public defenders
to be "employees of the government" for purposes of the exclusive
remedy provision. It appears, though, that the Seventh Circuit's in-
terpretation of the amended Federal Tort Claims Act likely signals
a new trend among federal courts of holding federal public defend-
ers immune from malpractice liability. 193 In sum, although claim-
"discretionary" acts) comprised over half of the claims. Id.
The amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act also explicitly allow the United States "to
assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been
available to the employee." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1994). In this respect, earlier case law addressing
immunity for federal public defenders may still be relevant. See supra notes 147-81 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the court decisions addressing federal public defender malpractice immu-
nity). As of this writing, however, no cases have raised this issue directly.
187. 21 F.3d 198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 670 (1994).
188. Id. at 203. The exclusive remedy provision applies to an "employee of the government,"
and the amendments broadened the definition of an employee to include officers and employees of
any federal agency, which includes the judiciary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (1994). Hence, the court
found that "the plain language of the statute" supported its holding. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 202.
189. 444 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that federal public defenders are not immune from state
malpractice suits under federal law).
190. Sullivan, 21 F.3d at 203.
191. Id. The Seventh Circuit also found Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S 312, 325 (1981),
ruling that federal public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing the
traditional function of a lawyer, to be inapposite. Id. at 204. The court stated that the issue was
not whether the public defenders acted under color of state law, but whether they were employees
of the federal government. Id. The court found that Polk County confirmed that they were. Id.
192. Id. at 206.
193. See 9 FED. LITIGATOR 167, 168 (1994) (stating that Sullivan is a good example of the
broad coverage of federal employees under the amended Act).
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ants may still proceed against the United States, recovery will likely
be rare as the United States retains its sovereign immunity for "dis-
cretionary" functions and duties.194 Similarly, the trend among state
courts is also to restrict recovery for malpractice by extending im-
munity to state public defenders, as discussed in the following
sections.1 95
F. States Refusing to Grant Malpractice Immunity to Public
Defenders
Traditionally, public defenders have not received immunity for
their actions.196 Commentators explain that this is because public
defenders are primarily viewed as lawyers with their main duty to
their clients, as opposed to being viewed as public officials. 197 Court
appointment does not make an attorney an agent of the state; he
still "owes his client the same diligence and care as any privately
retained attorney."198
Hence, the majority of state courts addressing the issue have re-
fused to grant malpractice immunity' 99 and have provided a host of
supporting reasons. The usual arguments asserted against immunity
are that the public defender is not like a judge or prosecuting attor-
ney, but rather like a private attorney whose only duty is to his cli-
ent; the public defender is not a "public official" to whom official or
statutory immunity attaches, but again, is like the private attorney;
and it would be unfair to indigent defendants to lose this important
civil remedy and may even be unconstitutional. 20 0 These arguments
are more fully developed in the following cases.
One of the first state court decisions to consider the question was
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Spring v. Constantino.2°' The
194. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "discretionary" du-
ties and its potential application in the legal malpractice context).
195. See infra notes 234-55 and accompanying text (discussing state courts that have granted
immunity from malpractice claims to public defenders).
196. KEATON ET AL., supra note 68, § 132, at 1058.
197. Id.
198. MEISELMAN, supra note 64, § 16:2.
199. Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975); Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888
(Fla. Ct. App. 1982); Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Delbridge v.
Office of the Pub. Defender, 569 A.2d 854 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1989); Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735
(Pa. 1979); Williams v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 586 A.2d 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
200. See infra notes 203-29 and accompanying text (discussing arguments cited by the state
courts in refusing to grant immunity).
201. 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975).
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state had advanced three different grounds for immunity, and the
court rejected each of them.20 2 The first basis offered for immunity
was judicial immunity, in that the policy for judicial immunity
should be applicable to public defenders, like it is to judges and
prosecutors.10 The state argued that immunity for judges and pros-
ecutors promotes freedom, independence, and "principled and fear-
less decision-making" by removing the threat of lawsuits.204 The
court, however, rejected the argument that public defenders func-
tion as judges and prosecutors.20 5 Instead, ,the court held that the
public defender's function was the same as any private attorney. 20 6
Unlike the prosecutor, who is a "representative of the state," the
public defender, upon assignment to his client, is a "representative
of that client. 20 7
The next basis the state offered for immunity was the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity which extends to public offi-
cials.20 8 The court rejected this on the ground that a public defender
is simply not a state public official. 209 The court held that although
the state has to insure that indigent defendants are represented by
counsel, the actual conduct of the public defender is hardly a gov-
ernmental act. 210 The court stated that "[t]he principle that the
state cannot function both as prosecutor and defender is so deeply
rooted in our system of justice as to require no citation. 2 1
The third ground the state offered was that public defenders were
entitled to immunity because of statutory immunity that extends to
public officers and employees of the state.21 2 The court rejected this
as well because it perceived a difference between state employees on
the one hand, and independent contractors, to whom immunity does
not attach, on the other.213 The court stated that public defenders
are more like the latter because although the state has some control
over the public defender, like where his office may be or who exactly
202. Id. at 873-79.
203. Id. at 873-74.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 874.
206. Id. at 874-75.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 875.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 875-76.
213. Id. at 878.
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his clients are, this control does not penetrate his functions assumed
by the attorney-client relationship. 14 Again, the court stated that
the public defender's relation to his client is the same as that of a
private attorney.215 The court also noted that the source of the pub-
lic defender's salary was irrelevant, his relation to his client is no
different than a private attorney has with her client. 26 Thus, the
court refused to grant public defenders immunity from malpractice
liability.217
Pennsylvania courts have ruled on public defender liability in the
context of different types of immunity. The first opportunity was in
1979 with the state supreme court's decision in Reese v. Dan-
forth.2 1 8 The Reese decision addressed the doctrine of official immu-
nity.21 9 The court noted that merely because public defenders are
paid by the state does not make them "public officers," but rather it
is the nature of an office and its powers that do.220 The court stated
that public defenders are like private attorneys, whose duty it is to
represent the client, against the interests of the government. 221 The
court found that "once the appointment of a public defender in a
given case is made, his public or state function ceases and thereafter
he functions purely as a private attorney concerned with servicing
his client. 222 The court then considered two policy arguments ad-
vanced in support of immunity: the need to attract and sustain able
lawyers to represent the indigent and the need for "unfettered dis-
cretion" in the performance of their duties.2  The court rejected
these arguments on the ground that immunity is an exception that
attaches only to certain offices.224 The court had already held that
the public defender was not such an office and emphasized that the
question "does not turn on the putative effect of the imposition of
the financial burdens attendant to tort liability. 225
The court then continued to hold that granting immunity would
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 879.
218. 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979).
219. Id. at 738.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 739.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 739-40.
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raise equal protection problems because it would deny a form of tort
relief to a certain class of people who could not afford a private
attorney.2 Finally, the court rejected the argument that other rem-
edies, such as habeas corpus 227 or the public defender's susceptibil-
ity to disciplinary actions, were enough to offset the client's injuries
caused by his defender's malpractice. 22 8 For these reasons, the court
refused to extend immunity to public defenders. 29
The reasoning used by the above courts in refusing to grant im-
munity has also been embraced by others, including the Michigan
Court of Appeals, 3 ° the First District Court of Appeals of Flor-
ida,23 1 and the Superior Court of New Jersey.23 2 Despite this history
of holding public defenders liable for malpractice, however, the cur-
rent trend in state courts is to extend such immunity to public de-
fenders.2 "3  The next section details these decisions.
G. States Granting Malpractice Immunity to Public Defenders
In recent years, several state courts have moved in the direction of
extending immunity to public defenders from state malpractice
226. Id. at 740.
227. Habeas corpus is defined as "[an independent proceeding instituted to determine whether
a defendant is being unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709
(6th ed. 1990). The most common purpose of the writ is to "test the legality of the detention or
imprisonment; not whether he is guilty or innocent." Id. at 710. The writ of habeas corpus is
guaranteed by the United States Constitution (Art. I, § 9) and also by state constitutions. Id.
228. Reese, 406 A.2d at 741.
229. Pennsylvania again reached the issue, this time with respect to statutory immunity, in
Williams v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 586 A.2d 924 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990). The superior court
held that public defenders were not covered by the state Tort Claims Act, which provided immu-
nity to local agencies or "public officials of some kind." Id. at 927. The court relied heavily on the
Reese and the Ferri decisions in ruling that public defenders were not entitled to statutory immu-
nity. Id. at 927-28; see also Veneri v. Pappano, 622 A.2d 977, 978 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (re-
affirming the refusal to grant immunity to public defenders).
230. Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that court appointed
attorneys for indigent defendants are not immune from state malpractice arising from defense of
the indigent defendants).
231. Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the doctrine
of judicial immunity did not preclude former client from suing public defender's office for mal-
practice arising out of representation of criminal defendant).
232. Delbridge v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 569 A.2d 854, 866 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1989) (finding public defenders to have no immunity from suit arising out of legal malpractice);
see also Briggs v. Lawrence, 281 Cal. Rptr. 578, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that
public defenders were public officials within the meaning of the state tort claims act which re-
moved immunity for public officials, thus ruling public defenders to be state officials, the court
actually rendered them liable for malpractice actions).
233. See infra notes 237-55 and accompanying text (discussing state court decisions holding
public defenders to be immune for malpractice).
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claims. 34 Most of the reasons cited for such rulings are policy con-
siderations such as the limited funds and heavy caseloads facing
public defender offices, the possible "chilling effect" that liability
would have on the public defender's defense strategies, and the
problems that liability would have on recruiting attorneys to public
defender offices.2 35 Also mentioned frequently is the difference be-
tween public defenders and private attorneys in that the public de-
fender cannot decline a client, even one with a meritless case. 38
This section discusses these cases and their arguments.
The earliest state court ruling on this issue was the Supreme
Court of Niagara County's 1978 ruling in Scott v. City of Niagara
Falls.237 The court considered the public defender a public official
because he "serves the public as much as he serves his particular
assigned client or clients. 238 The court felt that due to limited
funds and overburdened caseloads, "[tihe imposition of potential li-
ability to every assigned client will no doubt have a detrimental ef-
fect on the Public Defender's ability to effectively allocate his lim-
ited time and resources." 3 9 The court also believed that not
granting immunity would make recruiting lawyers to the public de-
fender office difficult.240
The court stated that the public defender was different from the
private attorney because he is not able to decline a "frivolous mat-
ter." '41 Furthermore, the court stated that the indigent defendant
could always proceed pro se or pursue post-conviction remedies like
habeas corpus.42 The court also noted. that the public defender
would still be subject to professional disciplinary action.24 The
court concluded by extending judicial immunity to public defenders
for any discretionary or judgmental acts performed in the course of
234. See, e.g., Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 952 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952
(1991); Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 773 (Minn. 1993); Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 343,
344-45 (Nev. 1989) (per curiam); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., 1978).
235. See infra notes 238-45 (discussing these arguments advanced by the courts in favor of
granting immunity).
236. See Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105 (holding public defender immune from personal liability
due to judgment decision but not from negligent performance in purely ministerial task).
237. 407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1978).
238. Id. at 105.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 106.
243. Id.
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their duties, 44 the purpose of which was to ensure "freedom to exer-
cise judgment and discretion in making legal decisions or
recommendations. ' 245
The rest of the state courts that have granted immunity to public
defenders have done so under statutory forms of official immunity,
usually by interpreting their state tort claims acts to cover public
defenders as "state employees. 2.46 The Delaware Supreme Court, in
Vick v. Hailer,2 47 ruled that public defenders were "state employ-
ees" within the meaning of the state's Tort Claims Act. 248 That
statute provided state employees with a qualified immunity that
would cover any discretionary acts performed in the course of duty,
as long as the employee acted in good faith and was not grossly
negligent.2 49 Therefore, the court allowed for a qualified immunity
to be provided to public defenders against malpractice. 50
In Browne v. Robb,251 the Delaware Supreme Court reached the
issue with respect to court appointed counsel.252 The court ruled
that court-appointed counsel also receive qualified immunity under
the state Tort Claims Act. 253 The court approvingly cited three pol-
icy reasons in support of immunity: to allow counsel to "fearlessly
244. The court also noted that because public defenders enjoyed this immunity, the immunity
also extended to the county. Id. The court noted, however, that any negligence in the performance
of a "ministerial" task would not be protected by immunity, and the county could then be held
liable. Id.
245. Id. The court cited approvingly several of the federal court decisions granting immunity
under section 1983, particularly Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1049 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding
public defenders immune under section 1983). Id.
246. Some states explicitly grant qualified official immunity to public defenders by statute. Ne-
vada expressly includes the Public Defender and his deputies in its statute that defines who is
subject to qualified official immunity. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0307 (4)(b) (1990) (defining public
defender as a public officer or officer protected by the immunity statute); id. § 41.032(2) (1989)
(mandating that officers of the state cannot be sued for malpractice arising out of discretionary
decisions made pursuant to her duties); see Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 343, 344 (Nev. 1989)
(per curiam) (applying the statute to a public defender accused of malpractice and a civil rights
action). Nevada's statute was later amended to also include court-appointed defense attorneys.
Act of July 12, 1993, ch. 547, sec. 3, § 41.037 (4)(b), 1993 Nev. Stat. 2261 (to be codified at
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0307 (4)(b)). Another state is Minnesota itself, which categorized public
defenders as state employees under its tort claims act. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.732 (West Supp.
1995). Minnesota's statute provides that state employees will not be liable for ministerial acts or
omissions performed with due care or for discretionary acts or omissions. Id. § 3.736 (3)(a)-3(b).
247. 522 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 866.
250. Id.
251. 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 950.
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and independently" litigate claims, to protect the public defender in
light of his duty to take on any client, and to recognize society's
"interest in avoiding duplicitous litigation. 254 Therefore, unless an
indigent client could overcome the statutory presumption of immu-
nity granted to state employees, the court-appointed attorney, like
the public defender, was immune from his own malpractice.255
Until recently, these cases and statutes represented the extent to
which public defenders were accorded immunity from malprac-
tice. 250 These same cases and statutes led commentators to note that
absolute immunity had been consistently rejected by the courts,
even if qualified immunity was becoming more common.257 Last
year, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court rendered its sweeping
decision in Dziubak v. Mott.258 This opinion is discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Factual Background
Richard Dziubak was charged with the murder of his mother,
May Speiser, who was found dead in her home on February, 27,
1987.259 A broken handrail and blood were found on the stairs lead-
ing to the basement, and during the autopsy, the medical examiner
found a note tucked in Speiser's underwear that read "Dick [Rich-
ard] killed me - threw me down basement. 20 0 The examiner ruled
the death a homicide caused by a blunt head trauma, consistent
with a fall down the stairs.26' The examiner also read a toxicology
report as indicating only a non-lethal amount of anti-depressants in
Speiser's blood. 2
Two public defenders, Thomas Mott and James Hankes, were as-
254. Id. at 951 (citing Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 743 (Pa. 1979) (O'Brien, J.,
dissenting)).
255. Id. at 952.
256. See supra notes 234-54 (outlining these cases and statutes).
257. Laura C. Hart et al., From Offense to Defense: Defending Legal Malpractice Claims, 45
S.C. L. REV. 771, 796-98 (1994) (noting that public defenders are not immune from malpractice
actions where attorney's behavior is outside of the bounds recognized for qualified immunity, i.e.,
where the attorney acts with malicious intent to injure her client).
258. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
259. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771
(Minn. 1993).
260. Id. The writing was her own. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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signed to Dziubak, with his trial scheduled for April 27, 1987.263
The public defenders had retained a medical expert, Dr. Plunkett, to
review the autopsy report and to draw conclusions from it.264 How-
ever, the public defenders did not actually speak with Dr. Plunkett
until two days before trial was to begin. 265 During that conversation,
Dr. Plunkett told one of the defenders, "[Y]ou have a problem. I
don't know why that woman is dead!"'266 Dr. Plunkett explained that
if Speiser actually suffered a head trauma, she would not likely
regain consciousness, and that she most likely would not even know
she was dying, and thus could not write the note.267 Dr. Plunkett
further told him that she could have died from an overdose and that
it would not necessarily have been disclosed on the toxicology re-
port.268 Finally, he told Mott that Speiser had been on anti-depres-
sants, which are prescribed for mental illness, including suicidal ten-
dencies. 269 The doctor said that it would be logical for a woman who
was suffering from depression to be vindictive toward her chil-
dren. 270 He also said that it was possible that Speiser survived a fall
or a push down the stairs, and then, as an act of revenge, wrote the
note blaming her son, and took an overdose. 17 Further, this would
make sense out of the note, because she would then know she was
going to die.27 2 The doctor said repeatedly that the medical exam-
iner's account he was given to read "was the kind of thing you see
on Saturday night T.V. ' ' 21 At the end of this conversation, the de-
fense attorney told the doctor that he would contact him later to
schedule court appearances.274 The public defenders never contacted
263. At the time of the state's supreme court decision, one of those public defenders, Thomas
Mott, was, and still is, a Judge of the Ramsey County District Court. Petition for Review at 1,
Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (No. C7-91-2517), rev'd, 503 N.w.2d
771 (Minn. 1993).
264. Respondent's Brief at 4, Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (No.
C7-91-2517), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
265. Id. at 4-5.
266. Id. at A-19 (containing a memorandum written by Mott regarding his interview with Dr.
Plunkett).
267. Id.
268. Id. at A-21.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at A-20; see also id. at A-19 (stating "[t]his is the stuff you see on Saturday night
T.V.").
274. Id. at A-21.
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Dr. Plunkett again.
The trial had been scheduled for the following Monday, but be-
cause the medical examiner was out of the country, trial had been
postponed until May.2 76 However, the public defenders never told
Dziubak that the trial had been postponed," and in fact they each
testified that they thought it best for Dziubak to enter a guilty
plea.2 8 They also never told Dziubak what Dr. Plunkett had said.279
Instead, in a sworn affidavit, Dziubak stated that his public defend-
ers told him that Dr. Plunkett "would testify the same as Dr. Haus,
the Ramsey County Medical Examiner, to the effect that the death
was caused by a blunt instrument blow."'280 They also told Dziubak
that no witnesses would be called to bolster his defense, such as Dr.
Plunkett or his siblings who could have testified as to the vindictive-
ness of the decedent.2 8' Rather, Dziubak claimed that his public de-
fenders placed him under "extreme pressure, duress and coercion"
by telling him that "at trial he would be found guilty." '282 These
statements were made minutes before Dziubak thought the trial was
to begin, with the belief that he had no defense.283 At that point,
Dziubak decided to plead guilty to a lesser charge, and was sen-
tenced to 81 months in prison.284
Fifteen months later, Dziubak moved to vacate his guilty plea on
the grounds of a lack of factual basis and on ineffective assistance of
counsel.2 85 However, it was soon discovered by Dr. Plunkett that he
had misread the toxicology report and there was indeed a lethal
amount of anti-depressants in Speiser's blood, and this was consis-
tent with his suicide theory.2 8  Dziubak amended his complaint, by
removing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and instead ar-
275. Id.
276. Appendix of Appellants at A-115, Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (No. C7-91-2517), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993) (containing an affidavit from
Thomas Mott).
277. Respondents Brief at 4 (No. C7-91-2517).
278. Id. at A- 117, (containing affidavits of both Mott and Hankes).
279. Id. at A-220-21 (containing an affidavit of Dziubak).
280. Id. at A-220.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at A-222.
284. Brief of Petitioners at 2, Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993) (No. C7-91-
2517).
285. Id. at 2-3.
286. Id. at 3.
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gued on the basis of newly discovered evidence.287 The court then
vacated the guilty plea, and Dziubak was tried and acquitted of all
charges. 88 In order to have his conviction set aside, receive a new
trial, and secure defense counsel, Dziubak indebted himself
$32,000.289
B. Malpractice Claim
1. Lower Court
On June 19, 1990, Dziubak commenced his negligence action
against his public defenders.290 The Ramsey District Court ruled
that public defenders are not absolutely immune from civil suits.29'
The court noted the policy arguments in favor of immunity, such as
the chilling effect on discretion, preventing loss of limited resources
that would be needed to defend such suits, and the interference with
recruitment to the public defender's office. 92 The court ruled,
though, that these policy considerations did not compel immunity.2 93
The court distinguished judges and prosecutors, who are viewed as
representing society, from the public defender, whose duty is to re-
present the client. 94 The court also stated that immunity would
deny indigent clients the right to sue, while non-indigent clients
maintained the opportunity to do so.295 Finally, the court noted that
over the course of 50 years, there had never been a case raising the
issue, demonstrating that the policy concerns were "ill founded. ' 296
2. Appellate Court
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal
to grant the public defenders immunity.297 The court, citing Ferri v.
287. Appendix of Appellants at A-225, Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (No. C7-91-2517), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
288. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
289. Appendix of Appellants at A-12, Dziubak, (No. C7-91-2517) (containing copy of Dzi-
ubak's complaint).
290. Dziubak, 486 N.w.2d at 839.
291. Appendix of Appellants at A-226, Dziubak, (No. C7-91-2517) (containing district court's
order and conclusions of law).
292. Id. at A-228 (containing memorandum explaining district court's order).
293. Id. at A-229.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at A-229-30.
297. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771
(Minn. 1993). The Court of Appeals did however rule in favor of defendants on grounds of collat-
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Ackerman,298 stated that judges and prosecutors represent society as
a whole, and therefore affect a wide range of people, each of whom
could be a potential controversy. 99 On the other hand, public de-
fenders owe a single duty to an individual client, and the fear of
liability for malpractice does not conflict with this duty to "zeal-
ously represent" that client. 300 In fact, the possibility of liability can
actually create an incentive for public defenders to perform their
duties. 301 In conclusion, the court cited the trial court's opinion,
stating that the lack of cases on the issue over a 50 year period
demonstrates that the arguments for immunity are
"exaggerated." 0 2
3. Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding public defenders
to be absolutely immune from malpractice liability.30 3 The majority
extended judicial immunity to public defenders for several policy
reasons. First, the court believed immunity would allow public de-
fenders to act freely in exercising judgment and thus protect the
best interests of the client. 304 The court acknowledged that private
attorneys must also exercise independence with the risk of liability
for malpractice, but the court noted that there are differences be-
tween the public defender and the private attorney that justified im-
munity for the former.3 05 These differences include the fact that a
public defender cannot reject a client, while the private attorney is
free to reject a client.30 6
Another key factor in the court's analysis was the underfunding
of public defender offices. 07 The court noted that the cost of having
to defend against malpractice suits would only further drain the re-
sources, thus hurting all indigent defendants.308 The majority be-
eral estoppel. Id. at 841.
298. For a discussion of Ferri, see supra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
299. Dziubak, 486 N.W.2d at 840 (citing Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
300. Id.
301. Id. (citing Ferri, 444 U.S. at 204).
302. Id.
303. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 771-72 (Minn. 1993).
304. Id. at 775.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 775-76.
308. Id. at 776. The court also approvingly cited Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir.
1972), which held that public defenders were immune under section 1983. Id. at 777.
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lieved that the injured client has sufficient remedies through the ap-
peals process, post-conviction relief, and habeas corpus.30 9 Finally,
the court expressed concern that an opposite ruling would lead to
problems in recruiting lawyers to the public defender office.310
4. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Gardebring, in her dissenting opinion, expressed strong
concerns about the potential impact this decision will have on indi-
gent defendants. " Justice Gardebring acknowledged that the pub-
lic defender would still be subject to professional sanctions, thus en-
couraging public defenders to act competently, but that in the
meantime, the defendant may still be wrongly convicted of a
crime."1 ' The dissent noted that even though post-conviction reme-
dies are available, they hardly compensate the defendant for the
time spent incarcerated. 1 8 Justice Gardebring firmly believed that
the civil remedy of a malpractice claim was necessary.3 14 Further-
more, the public defenders were likely covered by the state's indem-
nity provisions, thus overcoming any possible deterrence to the pub-
lic defender's office, as well as assuring that public defenders will
represent their clients without fear of liability.
31 5
Justice Gardebring noted that while it is true that public defend-
ers are overburdened and underfunded, the majority's ruling did no
more than "sanction the chronic underfunding."'3 6 Finally, she
stated that there would be no onslaught of litigation because most
claims would be dismissed, and it would be very difficult for an indi-
gent defendant to even find a private attorney willing to take the
case.31 7 The Analysis section below demonstrates that Justice
Gardebring wrote the more fair and convincing opinion and that the
majority should have refused to grant such expansive immunity to
public defenders.
309. Id. at 776.
310. Id. at 776-77.
311. Id. at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
312. Id.
313. Id. In Dziubak's case, this was sixteen months. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 839
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
314. Dziubak 503 N.W.2d at 778.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Dziubak represents the latest development in an interesting, yet
unwelcome, trend among state courts to hold public defenders im-
mune from claims of malpractice. Dziubak intensifies this trend by
being the first state court decision to grant absolute immunity-18 to
public defenders. This Analysis demonstrates that the Minnesota
Supreme Court wrongly decided the issue of immunity. The thrust
of the majority's decision was that public policy concerns mandated
granting immunity to public defenders.319 However, not only are
these grounds for immunity questionable, they operate to denigrate
the rights of the indigent defendant greatly. The following subsec-
tions address each of the arguments the court relied on in its ruling.
A. The Chilling Effect Argument
The majority asserted that public defenders must be free to exer-
cise independence and discretion in defending their clients, and that
liability would hamper these efforts. 20 This is a common view
shared by supporters of immunity.32 ' Concisely stated, the premise
of the argument is that "[t]he very prospect of a lawsuit has the
effect of inhibiting the lawyer in the exercise of judgment in the
management of the defense." '322 However, the Supreme Court previ-
ously refuted this argument by stating that "[t]he fear that an un-
successful defense of a criminal charge will lead to a malpractice
claim does not conflict with that function. If anything, it provides
the . . . incentive . . . to perform that function competently. 3 23
It would be difficult indeed to claim that the "independence" ex-
ercised by Dziubak's public defenders led only to a stronger defense.
Not only did the public defenders fail to speak with their medical
expert until two days before trial was scheduled, but they also failed
to tell Dziubak of the expert's doubts as to how Mae Speiser really
died.32 It is true that some decisions are for the lawyer's judgment,
318. See supra notes 246-55 and accompanying text (discussing the state court decisions which
granted qualified or limited immunity to public defenders but not an absolute immunity).
319. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775-76.
320. Id. at 775.
321. See, e.g., Ned J. Nakles, Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Case for Absolute Immunity
from Civil Liability, 81 DICK. L. REV. 229, 230 (1977) (explaining and defending the rule of
absolute civil immunity for criminal defense attorneys).
322. Id.
323. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
324. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771
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but "the client should be appraised of all viable defenses and make
the ultimate decision. '"325 In Dziubak's case, not only did there ap-
pear to be a lack of "independence" on defense strategy, but more
of a lack of defense strategy altogether. Hence, the argument that
this sort of behavior needs to be protected, under the guise of "inde-
pendence" and "discretion," amounts to no more than unsupported
rhetoric.
Furthermore, applying the "chilling effects" argument not only to
Dziubak's attorneys, but to all public defenders, illustrates that the
argument is greatly overstated. First, all private attorneys are sub-
ject to malpractice suits, and one could scarcely argue that this hin-
ders their independence and ability to zealously represent their cli-
ents. In fact, malpractice liability is a safeguard that serves to
motivate the lawyer to perform competently and provides the client
with a cause of action should his lawyer fail in those duties. 32 6 Sec-
ond, in the majority of states, public defenders have never been im-
mune for malpractice, a27 and there have never been widespread re-
ports of the fears they face.328 Thus, the "chilling effects" argument
is exaggerated and based on mere speculation.32 9
Nonetheless, the argument has been strained by commentators, to
the point where one author lamented that because the public de-
fender "exerts every effort to provide effective representation, he
should not be called upon to measure his every word in relation to
the personal consequences of a damage suit by his client. ' 330 Here
again, the public defender's susceptibility to civil suit is vastly exag-
gerated. The lawyer is not liable for every mistake he makes in han-
dling a client's case.33' He is not liable for a mere mistake in judg-
(Minn. 1993).
325. MALLEN & SMITH. supra note 61, at 292 (describing the attorney's role in post-conviction
matters as predominantly an advisor to his client).
326. For a brief overview of a legal malpractice claim, see supra notes 63-78 and accompany-
ing text.
327. See supra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (outlining the state court decisions that
refused to grant immunity).
328. See Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the
dearth of cases on the issue illustrates that the arguments for immunity are "exaggerated"), rev'd,
503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
329. Id.; see also Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 201 n.18 (1979) (stating that the argu-
ments advanced in favor of immunity, such as inhibiting the public defender in his duties, were
"speculative").
330. Nakles, supra note 321, at 233 (defending absolute civil immunity for criminal defense
lawyers).
331. Schnabel et al., supra note 66, at 322 (describing the duty of an attorney to his client and
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ment 13 2 He is also not typically responsible for honest and
reasonable mistakes of law or selection of a remedy.3 ' The lawyer is
not liable for an error he makes concerning a question of law in
which there is reasonable doubt.33 4 Even the majority in Dziubak
acknowledged that a negligence claim alleging a failure to pursue a
certain strategy would most likely fail because honest errors do not
automatically constitute malpractice.3 5
In addition to these limitations on liability, the client suing for
malpractice must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 3 6 that
not only was the attorney negligent, but that the attorney's negli-
gence proximately caused the injury. 3 7 This means that the client
has to prove "that 'but for' the negligence of the lawyer, the client's
• ..defense against a claim in the underlying action would have
been successful."' 8 Some jurisdictions go even further, and require
the client to show actual innocence before he can recover against his
lawyer. 39 In light of these limitations on liability and obstacles to
recovery, the public defender enjoys wide latitude in his practice,
and need not fear that every decision or action places him in
jeopardy.
B. The Deterrence Argument
The majority was convinced that liability would discourage law-
his potential liability for his actions).
332. Id.; see Bronstein v. Kalcheim & Kalcheim, Ltd., 414 N.E.2d 96, 98 (III. App. Ct. 1980)
(stating that under Illinois law an attorney is not liable to his client for mere error in judgment).
333. Schnabel et al., supra note 66, at 323 (stating that a lawyer's liability does not generally
extend to reasonable legal mistakes or an error in selection of a remedy); Transamerica Ins, Co. v.
Keown, 451 F. Supp. 397, 401 (D.N.J. 1978) (stating that attorney's standard of care is measured
by the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by others); Banerian v. O'Malley,
42 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that due to the complexities of the law
and other circumstances, attorneys cannot be held legally responsible for honest and reasonable
mistakes of law or errors made in the selection of a remedy).
334. Schnabel et al., supra note 66, at 322 (stating that a lawyer is not liable for errors con-
cerning legal questions where there is reasonable doubt); see Kirsch v. Duryea, 578 P.2d 935, 938
(Cal. 1978) (following the rule that an attorney is not liable for being in error as to a question of
law which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers).
335. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 1993).
336. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 339, at 574 (4th ed. 1992).
337. MEISELMAN, supra note 64, § 3:1, at 39; see also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the elements of causation that some courts require be proven in a successful claim
of malpractice).
338. MEISELMAN, supra note 64, § 3:1, at 40.
339. Id. § 16:1; see also supra note 73 (discussing court decisions requiring actual innocence
be proven to succeed in a legal malpractice suit).
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yers from working as public defenders. " ' This is a popular argu-
ment asserted by courts granting immunity.3 4" The majority, how-
ever, failed to account for the fact that most states never allowed
immunity as a defense for malpractice.-42 Despite the risk of liabil-
ity, though, public defender employment is notoriously a competitive
process and a "highly sought-after job. 34 3 After so many years of
potential liability, it is doubtful that lawyers would suddenly be de-
terred from this career.
Important, too, is the fact that the majority never even discussed
Minnesota's state tort claims act, which already likely provided a
qualified immunity for the public defenders. " The court thereby
ignored the "broad protection already in place for public defend-
ers." 45 Hence, the court's reliance on deterrence concerns appears
to be somewhat disingenuous.
Even if the deterrence concerns were proven to be valid, there are
less extreme measures that could be employed to avoid them. For
example, the Supreme Court has suggested that concerns of deter-
rence from the profession may be diffused by the simple step of in-
creasing public defenders' salaries.34 Or, as Justice Gardebring
noted in her dissenting opinion, state indemnification would be a vi-
able option. 47 As one commentator explains, states could provide
340. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. 1993).
341. For an overview of state court decisions granting immunity to public defenders, see supra
notes 234-57 and accompanying text.
342. KEATON ET AL.. supra note 68, at 1058 (stating that public defenders are denied immunity
because they are seen as lawyers with a primary duty to a client rather than as a public official).
For a list of these decisions, see supra note 204.
343. Charles Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking motivations to Sustain Public De-
fenders. 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (1993).
344. See Jeffrey H. Rutherford, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance the Interests
of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 MINN. L. REV. 977, 1001 (1994) (discussing
the Dziubak court's failure to analyze liability under the Minnesota Tort Claims Act); see also
MINN STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (3)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing immunity to the state and its
employees for discretionary duties); id. § 3.732 (1) (including public defenders in the definition of
state employees for purposes of the state's tort liability act).
345. Rutherford, supra note 344, at 1008. In doing so, the court wrongly denied Mr. Dziubak
of an existing statutory mechanism that may have provided him a remedy. Id. at 1008-09.
346. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
347. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting); see
also Stephen L. Millich, Public Defender Malpractice Liability in California, II WHITTIER L.
REV. 535, 540-41 (1989) (discussing the benefits of a state tort claims act construed to include
public defenders, thus providing indemnity). Some states explicitly indemnify public defenders,
such as Illinois, 5 ILCS 350/2 (a) (West Supp. 1995); see also supra note 160 (discussing the
authority of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to indemnify or
purchase liability insurance for federal public defenders).
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indemnity to public defenders under their tort claims acts, thus en-
couraging defenders to continue working.348 A similar alternative to
immunity is for the state to purchase malpractice insurance for its
public defenders.34 9
Both of these options, indemnity and state-covered insurance, are
especially appealing in light of the fact that underfunding and ex-
cessive caseloads are beyond the public defender's control.35 ° It may
seem unfair to hold the defender personally liable under these condi-
tions.351 Indemnity or insurance provided by the state may be an
equitable compromise, 52 then, because these types of mechanisms
would serve to protect the interests of both the public defender and
the indigent client. 353
C. The Floodgates of Litigation Argument
The majority also focused on the resources and time that would
be directed from the public defender offices in having to defend
against malpractice claims.354 The court believed that such claims
would actually hurt indigent defendants on the whole by diverting
scarce resources away from the clients' defenses and into the attor-
neys' defenses.355 The majority, though, while duly noting the gross
348. Millich, supra note 347, at 539-40.
349. See Ronald E. Mallen, The Court-Appointed Lawyer and Legal Malpractice - Liability or
Immunity, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 59, 70 (1976) (suggesting that public defender offices should
provide insurance coverage for its attorneys); see also supra note 160 (discussing the authority of
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to purchase malpractice insur-
ance for federal public defenders).
350. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776 (describing an increasing crime rate, increasing claims of
indigence and lower state budgets as responsible for creating an overworked and underfunded
public defenders office).
351. Id. (stating that it would be an unfair burden to subject public defenders to malpractice
due to impossible caseloads and underfunding which are both outside of the public defender's
control).
352. Mandating the state to sustain the costs of malpractice suits is justified in light of the
history of state and local governments allocating minimal percentages of criminal justice funds to
public defense. Thus, it is equitable to hold the state responsible for the constraints public defend-
ers work under. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text (discussing the chronic underfund-
ing of public defense).
353. Millich, supra note 347, at 540 (suggesting that passing liability on to the public de-
fender's employer through the Tort Claims Act would provide the incentive for more qualified
public defenders and would thus help indigent defendants); see Rutherford, supra note 344, at
1006-10 (proposing a two-pronged solution of a) modifying the threshold for proving ineffective
assistance of counsel and b) subjecting public defenders to a limited statutory liability, thus pre-
serving the rights of indigent defendants without ignoring the plight of public defenders).
354. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775-76.
355. Id.
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underfunding of public defense offices, did little more than "sanction
[this] chronic underfunding."3 56 Furthermore, litigation would be a
rare occurrence because not only would the indigent client have to
find a private attorney willing to take the case, 57 but he would also
most likely have to allege some sort of innocence, 358 thus weeding
out the meritless claims.3 59
The Supreme Court has also considered the argument that liabil-
ity would lead to an opening of the floodgates in litigation in Tower
v. Glover."'° The Court stated, referring to whether it should extend
immunity for section 1983 claims to court appointed counsel, that
Congress should be the body to decide if such litigation is too bur-
densome." Although this statement was made in the context of
Civil Rights claims, the Court held that it did not have the right to
establish immunities based on "what we judge to be sound public
policy."3 2 Similarly, state legislatures, aided with the benefit of em-
pirical data, are the appropriate bodies to decide whether such im-
munity should be granted. 63 Finally, as both lower courts in Minne-
sota observed, the small amount of cases in this area indicate that
this concern is "ill founded" and "exaggerated."364
D. The Adequate Remedies Argument
The majority was satisfied that depriving the client of a malprac-
tice claim would not result in unfairness because he would still have
the appeals process, post-conviction remedies and habeas corpus
available to him. 65 While this may be true, it is of small comfort to
the person who has already been convicted and sentenced to prison.
In Dziubak's case, he spent sixteen months in jail, due to his defend-
ers' negligence, while his only remedy was to have the plea set aside
356. Id. at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
357. Id.
358. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing the rather onerous burdens dif-
ferent courts require for a malpractice claim to succeed).
359. However, the majority was concerned not only with actual damage awards, but also with
the fact that a malpractice suit would distract the public defender from his duties, and that dis-
covery alone would consume precious resources, time and energy. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776.
360. 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See Rutherford, supra note 344, at 1008 (arguing that the state legislature is in a better
position to make any decision on the issue of immunity).
364. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503 N.w.2d 771
(Minn. 1993).
365. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776.
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and have his case go to trial. 366 Post-conviction relief obtained his
freedom, but it did not compensate him for the lost months of his
life. In addition, he incurred $32,000 in legal fees, for which he
alone is now responsible.30 7
With respect to other forms of post conviction remedies, notably
appeals, the United States Supreme Court has placed a very high
burden of proof on the defendant appealing a conviction based on
ineffective assistance of counsel.36 8 The Court, in Strickland v.
Washington,369 held that there is a presumption that the attorney
did act competently, and even if the defendant can show otherwise,
relief will not be granted unless he can also show a reasonable
probability that but for his attorney's ineffectiveness, the trial result
would have been different.370
E. The Public Defender v. Private Attorney Argument
Finally, the majority believed that public defenders and private
attorneys are different enough to justify extending immunity to the
latter. 37' However, the Supreme Court has previously considered the
arguments that public defenders are different from private attorneys
and has rejected them each time.3 72 The Supreme Court has stated
that "the primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels
the office of privately retained counsel. ' 373 Except in the sense that
he serves in accordance with statutory authorization and in order to
provide the constitutionally required counsel, the public defender's
366. Dziubak, 486 N.W.2d at 839; see Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissent-
ing) (stating "[tihe presence of remedies to overturn the conviction due to ineffectiveness of coun-
sel cannot fully 'right the wrong' done to someone who may have spent extended period of time
incarcerated unjustly").
367. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing how Dziubak indebted himself
$32,000 in order to have his conviction set aside, receive a new trial, and secure defense counsel).
368. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984) (describing the defendant's
burden as onerous because counsel's errors must be so serious to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial and judicial scrutiny of an attorney's performance is highly deferential).
369. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
370. Id. at 693-94. The Strickland test also applies to habeas petitions based on incompetent
assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986). Post-conviction reme-
dies and habeas corpus proceedings also serve to weed out claims of malpractice. Many courts will
not allow malpractice suits to proceed where the client was unsuccessful in his appeal and habeas
corpus attempts based on attorney incompetence. MEISELMAN, supra note 64, §16:1. This is be-
cause the client is considered to be collaterally estopped, as the issue has already been decided. Id.
371. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993).
372. See infra note 377 and accompanying text (comparing private attorneys and public de-
fenders and deciding that the two types of attorneys have the same principle responsibilities).
373. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 194, 204 (1979).
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duty is not to the public at large, like a judge or other governmental
official. 7 ' Rather, "[h]is principle responsibility is to serve the undi-
vided interests of his client."' 371 In light of these Supreme Court de-
cisions, the arguments advanced by the Minnesota Supreme Court
are poor support for a finding of immunity.3 7 6
Similarly, the majority of state courts reaching the issue have
concluded that public defenders and court appointed counsel func-
tion more like private attorneys, rather than like judges, prosecutors,
or other government officials entitled to immunity.17  Despite this
large body of precedent, however, the Minnesota court has become
the latest to disregard these decisions and extend immunity to public
defenders.37 8 The impact of this decision is discussed in the follow-
ing section.
V. IMPACT
Dziubak is a significant case because it indicates a troublesome
trend in state law. In recent years, state courts have begun to extend
immunity to public defenders for their malpractice.3 79 The ramifica-
tions of these decisions are quite serious and are explained in the
following subsections.
A. Denying The Indigent A Civil Remedy
The most obvious result of decisions like these is that it leaves the
indigent client with no civil remedy for injuries caused by his de-
fender's malpractice. Nonetheless, the courts denying this cause of
374. Id.
375. Id.; see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (holding that public de-
fenders do no act under color of state law. In so holding, the court stated that "[o]nce a lawyer
has undertaken the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether
the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender program").
376. But see supra notes 182-95 and accompanying text (discussing the recently amended Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act and its likely application to federal public defenders).
377. See, e.g., Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 874-75 (Conn. 1975) (describing the pub-
lic defender as a representative of his client that performs a similar role to that of a privately
retained attorney); Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80, 82 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to draw
a distinction between appointed and retained counsel in malpractice cases); Reese v. Danforth,
406 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1979) (determining that a public defender, after appointment, functions
purely as a private attorney); Williams v. Office of the Pub. Defender, 586 A.2d 924, 927 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (finding no basis for differentiating between a public defender and a private
attorney).
378. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
379. See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text (discussing trend in holding public defend-
ers immune from malpractice liability).
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action were satisfied that other legal provisions, such as habeas
corpus and post-conviction relief, are sufficient to protect the cli-
ent.3 80 While these remedies may obtain the defendant's freedom,
they fail to compensate for the damages inflicted on the defendant.
Richard Dziubak, for instance, lost sixteen months of his life in jail
and incurred over $30,000 to obtain his justice.381 All he received,
though, was a revocation of his guilty plea and a new trial.382 This is
why many commentators agree that a civil remedy is needed to
truly protect the indigent defendant.8 3
B. Equal Protection Problems
The denial of a civil remedy to an indigent defendant also raises
potential equal protection problems in that it denies a form of civil
remedy to a particular class of people, while the remedy is available
to those who can afford private counsel.38 " As the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court stated, this would lead to differentiating "between
groups of plaintiffs based on their economic status" and that
"[s]uch a distinction would raise troublesome equal protection
questions. '"385
The equal protection concerns find their roots in several Supreme
Court decisions, such as Griffin v. Illinois,'8 " wherein the Court
stated that there is "no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has. 887 In Griffin, the
Court found a violation of the equal protection clause where a state
allowed only those who could afford court materials to appeal.3 88
380. See, e.g., Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775 (stating that the defendant who thinks his attorney
was negligent is not without remedies through the appeal process, motions for habeas corpus, and
post conviction relief).
381. For the factual background of this case, see supra notes 259-89 and accompanying text.
382. For the factual background of this case, see supra notes 259-89 and accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., Mallen, supra note 349, at 69 (stating that "[a] grant of immunity to court
appointed counsel will leave indigents with only habeas corpus relief for a conviction attributable
to incompetence of counsel"); see also Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[tihe presence of remedies to overturn the conviction due to ineffectiveness of coun-
sel cannot fully 'right the wrong' done to someone who may have spent extended periods of time
incarcerated unjustly").
384. See Comment supra note 81, at 1420 (discussing equal protection problems with granting
immunity to public defenders); see also Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 740 (Pa. 1979) (stating
that the responsibilities of public defenders should not be affected by the economic status of their
clientele).
385. Reese, 406 A.2d at 740.
386. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
387. Id. at 19.
388. Id.
1044 [Vol. 44:999
DZIUBAK v. MOTT
Blanketing public defenders with immunity from malpractice suits
approaches the "paradigmatic example of a denial of equal protec-
tion. . . .[Requiring] that attorney's fees be paid as a prerequisite
to bringing a subsequent suit for malpractice ...draws economic
lines of access to the courts."' 89 Accordingly, courts should be cau-
tious in drawing such lines.
C. Alters the Traditional Role and Responsibilities of the
Attorney
Any attempt by lawyers to limit their liability is generally consid-
ered unethical. 9 0 Not only has the Dziubak decision flouted this
maxim, but it also alters the traditional attorney-client relationship.
This decision creates an interesting conflict in that the public de-
fender, like any other attorney, has one primary purpose, and that is
to serve his client's interests.3 91 If the attorney negligently performs
that duty, he, like any other professional, is potentially liable for
malpractice.3 92 Now, though, neither the public defender nor the
state is responsible to the client for the public defender's malprac-
tice; the court has, in a sense, allowed the state to step in to protect
itself, while altering the traditional remedies a client has against his
attorney.3 93 There are actually a number of public defenders who
have argued against such extensions of immunity.394 For example,
the Chief Public Defender of Hennepin County in Minnesota stated
he was "strongly opposed" to immunity and referred to the idea as a
389. Comment, supra note 81, at 1428 (discussing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) which
found that allowing only those able to pay the cost of appellate materials to appeal was a violation
of equal protection). The author further explains the Supreme Court's Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) decision. Id. at 1428-29. In that case, the Court found a violation of the due
process clause where a state required the indigent to pay a fee before allowing access to court for
a divorce. Boddie. 401 U.S. at 374. The Court found that "due process requires ... that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right
and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id. at
377. The author persuasively argues that a malpractice claim serves to allow the plaintiff to settle
such claims of rights and duties. Comment, supra note 81, at 1428.
390. Mallen, supra note 349, at 69.
391. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1984) (describing a lawyer's pri-
mary responsibilities as representing a client and being an officer of the court).
392. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (discussing malpractice liability).
393. See, e.g., Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 875 (Conn. 1975) (stating that the public
defender's role is no different from that of a private attorney, and therefore provides no basis for
extending immunity to the former).
394. See e.g., Smolowe, supra note 34, at 48 (discussing how a Louisiana lawyer brought suit
against himself for malpractice); see also infra note 395 and accompanying text.
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"slap at the poor."3 95
D. The Decision Fails to Address the Real Problems
The opinion is most disappointing for its failure to address the
real problems plaguing public defenders. As discussed earlier, public
defender offices suffer from significant underfunding and excessive
caseloads.3 98 These problems are already immense, even without im-
munity, because, as one writer has aptly explained, politicians at
most have "little to gain by advocating large expenditures for the
defender office, and at worse, much to lose."3 97 Yet when a court or
state grants immunity to public defenders, it does no more than im-
plicitly sanction the problems facing the defense system. 98
In fact, rulings like Dziubak may actually contribute to these
problems. As Minnesota's chief state public defender, John Stuart,
argued, there should be liability because then the state will be less
likely to cut the public defender budget or staff if it knows it may be
liable for such claims. 399 Although granting immunity may be con-
venient in its simplicity, it only ignores, if not exacerbates, the real
problems facing public defenders.40 0 The decision has a final unfor-
tunate impact in that it "may adversely affect future consideration
of immunity because it asserted, without citing empirical evidence,
that absolute immunity will improve representation, promote profes-
sionalism and ease the burden on overworked defenders."4 0'
IV. CONCLUSION
Dziubak v. Mott signifies a dangerous trend in state public de-
fense systems. With its sweeping decision, the court extended abso-
395. Margaret Zack, State Court to Look at Indigents' Right to Sue Defenders, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Feb. 8, 1993, at Al.
396. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text (discussing the problems facing public
defenders).
397. Mounts, supra note 33, at 481.
398. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Minn. 1993) (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (claim-
ing that it is unfair to impose liability on public defenders with underfunded offices and over-
loaded caseloads).
399. Zack, supra note 395, at Al (arguing risk of liability creates an incentive to keep staff).
400. It is imperative for an attorney to render effective legal services for the right to counsel to
be meaningful. LEFSTEIN, supra note 35, at 5. Hence, the resolution lies in improving the system,
not in granting immunity.
401. Rutherford, supra note 344, at 980; see also Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 200, 204
(1979) (indicating that decisions of immunity were best left to Congress to decide on the basis of
empirical data and not mere speculation).
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lute immunity to public defenders for their malpractice. 02 The
court disregarded its own state tort claims act, as well as the body
of precedent refusing to grant immunity to public defenders, and
instead relied on speculative public policy arguments to justify its
decision.403 While the opinion may be laudable in its attempt to ease
the burden on public defenders, it only serves to denigrate the rights
of the indigent. The decision is disappointing in its failure to address
the real problem of underfunding and the harm it causes to those
whom public defense is intended to protect. Future courts are ad-
vised to eschew the holding of Dziubak and to strive for greater
protection of the rights of the indigent.
Erika E. Pedersen
402. See supra notes 303-10 and accompanying text (describing the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision to hold public defenders immune from liability).
403. See Rutherford, supra note 344, at 1001 (discussing the Dziubak court's failure to ana-
lyze liability under the Minnesota state tort claims act).
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